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IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT

RICKY ANGILAU,
PETITIONER,
CASE NO. 20090677
V,

INCARCERATED

STATE OF UTAH AND SHERIFF
JAMES M. WINDER,
RESPONDENTS.

JURISDICTION OF UTAH SUPREME COURT
Utah Code Ann. § 78A-3-102(3)(i) recognizes this Court's jurisdiction over
appeals from the district court involving first degree felonies.1 The notice of appeal was
timely filed on August 5, 2009 (R. 565-66), from the final order which entered on August
4, 2009 (R. 549-64).

2

This case is also arguably within the jurisdiction of the court of appeals by virtue
of Utah Code Ann. § 78A-4-103(2)(f), which recognizes the court of appeals' jurisdiction
over "appeals from orders on petitions for extraordinary writs sought by persons who are
incarcerated or serving any other criminal sentence, except petitions constituting a
challenge to a conviction of or the sentence for a first degree or capital felony[.]"
Given the interrelated nature of this case and Angilau's interlocutory appeal in this
Court concerning the unconstitutionality of the direct file statute, case number 20090538SC, counsel for Angilau elected to file this appeal in this Court. This Court recalled this
case from the court of appeals after initially transferring it.

ISSUES. STANDARDS OF REVIEW AND PRESERVATION2
Issue 1: Does the incarceration of direct file children in the Salt Lake County Jail,
which does not comply with Juvenile Jail Standards, violate the Utah Code?
The trial court's ruling on this question of law is assessed without deference for
correctness. See, e ^ , Bvbee v. Abdulla. 2008 UT 35, ^ 7, 189 P.3d 40.
This issue was preserved in the trial court (e.g. R. 10-14, 201-06).
Issue 2: Does the pretrial incarceration of direct file children in the Salt Lake
County Jail violate the constitutions?
The trial court's ruling on this question of law is assessed without deference for
correctness. See, e.g., Bvbee v. Abdulla. 2008 UT 35, f 7, 189 P.3d 40.
This issue was preserved in the trial court (e.g. R. 16-19, 209-213).

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS. STATUTES, RULES AND REGULATIONS
Pertinent constitutional provisions, statutes, rules and regulations are in the
addendum.

2

The issues raised herein were also addressed in the emergency petition for
extraordinary relief filed in this Court, a copy of which was also filed in the trial court
while the trial court had the matter under advisement (R. R. 147-536).
2

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
NATURE OF THE CASE. COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS AND DISPOSITION
The State of Utah charged sixteen year old Angilau in adult court under the direct
file statute with murder, obstruction of justice, carrying a concealed dangerous weapon,
and possessing a firearm on school premises (e.g. R. 46).

Upon his arrest on January 21,

2009, the police took Angilau to detention, where he was held without incident or hearing
until he was transferred to the Salt Lake County Jail on January 26, 2009 (R. 543).
Angilau filed a petition for extraordinary relief challenging the legality of his
incarceration in the adult jail (R. 1-38). The court found that the petition was not
frivolous on its face, and ordered the clerk to serve a copy on the Utah Attorney General's
Office and the District Attorney's Office (R. 44-45). After all parties were given a full
opportunity to respond to the petition and the issues were briefed and argued, the court
denied the petition (R. 549-64).

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Ricky Angilau was born on November 27, 1992, and is sixteen years old (R. 542).
He was charged by information filed directly in adult court with murder, obstruction of
justice, carrying a concealed dangerous weapon, and possessing a firearm on school
premises (e.g. R. 46). After he was arrested on January 21, 2009, he was held in juvenile

3

detention without incident or a hearing until January 26, 2009 (R. 543). On January 26,
2009, he was transferred to the Adult Detention Center or jail (R. 543).
He was initially housed in general population (R. 543). While housed there, he
had several adult cellmates who were roughly three times his age. He spent roughly eight
hours a day with approximately sixty adult inmates, many of whom were in jail on
aggravated felony charges (R. 543).
Contrary to Juvenile Jail Standards, there is no constant television monitoring in
general population, either in the common areas, or in the cells (R. 543). In general
population, there is periodic but not constant guard supervision, and the cells have
intercoms (R. 543). He was not checked regularly by anyone on the jail staff regarding
his emotional status or needs (R. 543). He was given packets of school work to complete
on my own in an effort to obtain a GED (R. 543). He was also given and took the
opportunities to participate in mental health and other classes (R. 543).
On April 18, 2009, he was moved to maximum security, where he spent an average
of 23 hours a day in his cell, which he shared with a cellmate (R. 544). In maximum
security, his cellmates changed periodically (R. 544). In the one hour a day he was
allowed out of his cell in maximum security, he showered, cleaned his cell, made phone
calls, exercised, and socialized with varying groups of three adult maximum security
inmates (R. 544). At times in maximum security, he was allowed to receive educational
packets to complete on his own in an effort to obtain his GED, but at times, he was not

4

given this opportunity (R. 544). At times, he was denied personal or telephonic visits
with his family (R. 544). The mental health and other classes he participated in in general
population are not available in maximum security (R. 544).
Contrary to Juvenile Jail Standards, there is no constant television monitoring in
maximum security, either in the common areas, or in the cells (R. 544). There is periodic
but not constant guard supervision, and the cells have intercoms (R. 544). He was not
checked regularly by anyone on the jail staff regarding his emotional status or needs (R.
545).
Angilau had one disciplinary hearing since coming to the jail, wherein he was
disciplined for giving away his razor to another inmate (R. 545). He does not shave or
need a razor and at the time he did not realize that giving his razor to another inmate
would be considered a weapons violation (R. 545). He has received writeups for other
non-violent rule violations: storing non-commissary food, sharing with inmates, having a
bowl with a lid, and covering a vent (R. 545).
Prior to being incarcerated, Angilau was physically active in sports, working hard
at school, and participated regularly in family, scouting and church activities (R. 216-233,
545). Since coming to the jail, he has experienced periods when he could not sleep,
periods when he slept most of the day, weight loss, weight gain, and facial tics (R. 545).
Chief Rollin Cook, who runs the jail, submitted an affidavit attesting to the jail's
feeding, clothing and sheltering Angilau and providing him with medical and mental
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health care upon request (R. 539). Chief Cook indicated that Angilau had reported no
attacks on him, amd that Cook was not aware of any (R. 539). He indicated that inmates
are clearly instructed not to give away their razors, which are often used as weapons (R.
539). He conceded that the Juvenile Jail Standards are not observed in the jail, and noted
that if they were,, the already overcrowded jail would be required to release additional
inmates and permanently vacate 128 beds (R. 538-39).

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
The Utah code requires specific statutory authorization for the incarceration of
children in adult jails, and classifies the unauthorized housing of children in adult
facilities as a class B misdemeanor. Utah Code Ann. § 62A-7-201. Ricky Angilau, age
16, was charged by information in adult court with murder and other offenses under the
direct file statute, Utah Code Ann. § 78A-6-701 (R. 46, 542). There is no statutory
authorization for direct file children to be housed in the jail, and thus, his incarceration
there constitutes a class B misdemeanor.
The code requires adult facilities housing children to comply with Juvenile Jail
Standards, to insure the safe and humane treatment of children. See, e.g., Utah Code
Ann. § 62A-7-201(l). Accordingly, the Department of Human Services has enacted
administrative rules which are necessary to the safe and humane incarceration of children.
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See, generally. Utah Admin. Code R547-3-1 through 3, and R547-7. The jail where
Angilau is housed does not comply with these standards.
Because Angilau's incarceration violates the Utah codes, it similarly violates the
due process, uniform operation of laws, and equal protection guarantees of our
constitutions. The punitive nature of his incarceration as a pretrial detainee establishes a
federal due process violation, and similarly establishes a violation of the unnecessary
rigor clause of Article I § 9.
This Court should order Ricky Angilau's release from the jail.

ARGUMENTS
I.

THE INCARCERATION OF DIRECT FILE CHILDREN IN THE ADULT
JAIL VIOLATES THE UTAH CODE.
A.

OUR LEGISLATURE WISELY EXTENDS SPECIAL
PROTECTION TO INCARCERATED CHILDREN IN THE
CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM.

It has long been recognized that an inherent element of civilized society is its
provision for the needs of its children. In re Tanner. 549 P.2d 703, 705 (Utah 1976).
In Utah, the legislature has created a juvenile court system and related laws to serve the
public interest in meeting the special needs of children, Anderson v. Anderson, M6 P.2d
308, 309-310 (Utah 1966).
The need for special treatment of children is borne out in recent scientific and
sociological studies, which demonstrate that the brains of adolescent children are not yet
7

fully developed, particularly in the frontal lobes, which control decision-making. By
reviewing the amicus briefs filed in Roper v. Simmons. 543 U.S. 551 (2005), in the
second district court pleadings file this Court may confirm that children who are under the
age of eighteen have brains which are not yet developed, and as a result, they lack the
ability to control their emotions and impulses, anticipate the consequences of their
actions, accurately perceive risks to themselves or others, accurately gauge the impact of
their acts and responses, or to make reasoned choices of behavior. See R. 250-59, 293310.
While it was addressing the non-suitability of juveniles for capital punishment,
rather than non-suitability of juveniles for incarceration in adult facilities, our Supreme
Court in Roper recognized many of the developmental characteristics of adolescents
which leave them ill-suited to being incarcerated in adult jails. For instance, adolescents
are more vulnerable than adults to psychological damage. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S.
551, 569 (2005). They have an underdeveloped sense of responsibility and lack maturity.
Thus, they often take impetuous and reckless actions and make decisions without
thorough consideration. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 569 (2005). Adolescents are
less likely to restrain their impulses, understand the perspectives of others, and consider
alternative actions. Id. Their poor choices and actions are influenced by their
impressionable nature and their vulnerability to peer pressure and other negative
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influences. Id. They have less experience controlling their environments than adults do,
and their character traits are also less well-formed than adults'. Id.
Children are not physically or emotionally or mentally equipped to deal with the
environment of regular adult jails and prisons. See, e.g., Katz Levi, "State v. Mohi: State
Sanctioned Abuse," 10 Journal of Law and Family Studies 173, 174-76 and
accompanying notes (2007) (explaining how incarcerating children in adult jails
endangers children, and increases the risk of suicide), in the second volume of the district
court's pleadings file at R. 315-347. Likely in recognition of the vulnerability of children
and their unique developmental needs, Utah laws are designed to protect children from
harmful incarceration. The legislature has criminalized the holding of children in the
adult detention facilities absent explicit statutory authorization, see Utah Code Ann. §
62A-7-201(l) and (5), and requires that the adult facilities holding children comply with
Juvenile Jail Standards to insure the safe and humane treatment of children in adult
facilities, see, e ^ , Utah Code Ann. § 62A-1-111 and 62A-7-201.
Accordingly, Rule 547-3 in the Utah Administrative Code sets forth the law
requiring "[a]ny jail or adult holding facility intended for use of juveniles" to be certified
by the Division of Juvenile Justice and Services. R547-3-3(3). Additionally, our
Division of Human Services has carefully studied and implemented administrative rules
which must be observed to insure the safe and humane incarceration of children. See,
generally, Utah Admin. Code R547-3-1 through 3, and R547-7. These rules were

9

expressly promulgated by the Division of Human Services pursuant to legislative
authorization in Utah Code Ann. § 62A-1-111. If it is necessary to house children in
secure facilities, we require those facilities to comply with Juvenile Justice Services
standards, which are carefully designed in an effort to insure that the holding conditions
are humane, safe, and foster continuing education and positive child development. See,
e.g., Utah Code Ann. §62A-7-104. These administrative regulations have the effect of
law. See, e ^ , Utah Code Ann. § 63G-3-202(2); Robinson v. State, 2001 UT 21, ^ 8 n.l,
20P.3d396.

B.

THE INCARCERATION OF DIRECT FILE
CHILDREN IN THE ADULT JAIL IS A CRIME.

The statute governing the placement of juveniles in adult facilities, Utah Code
Ann. § 62A-7-201, reflects a general statutory presumption against the incarceration of
juveniles in adult facilities and requires express statutory authorization for such
placements. Subsection 1 provides in this regard:
(1) Children under 18 years of age, who are apprehended by any
officer or brought before any court for examination under any provision of
state law, may not be confined in jails, lockups, or cells used for persons 18
years of age or older who are charged with crime, or in secure
postadjudication correctional facilities operated by the division, except as
provided by specific statute and in conformance with standards approved by
the board.
The statute expressly permits the housing of children whose cases are filed under the
Serious Youth Offender statute and the certification statutes in adult facilities in limited
10

circumstances. See Utah Code Ann. § 62A-7-201(2). The statute permits adult facilities
in areas of our state with low populations to house certain children in limited
circumstances for six hours. See Utah Code Ann. § 62A-7-201(3). The statute permits
certain children to be held in holding rooms for two hours in limited circumstances in
adult facilities, such as while they are being interrogated for certain crimes. See Utah
Code Ann. § 62A-7-201(4). Finally, subsection (5) of the statute indicates in no uncertain
terms: "Willful failure to comply with any of the provisions of this section is a class B
misdemeanor."
There is no statutory authorization in 62A-7-201 or elsewhere in the code which
permits juveniles whose cases are directly filed in adult court to be housed in adult
detention facilities or the jail. Accordingly, under subsections (1) and (5) of that statute,
the detention of Angilau and other direct file children in the jail is a class B
misdemeanor. See id.

C.

THE TRIAL COURT'S STATUTORY INTERPRETATION WAS
INCORRECT.
1.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN APPLYING THE
ABSURD RESULTS DOCTRINE OF STATUTORY
INTERPRETATION.

The trial court declined to apply the plain language of the statutes which reflect
that housing direct file children in the jail is a crime, in an effort to avoid what it
11

perceived to be the absurd result of direct file children being excluded from the adult jail,
in contrast to the Serious Youth Offender and certified children, who are statutorily
authorized to be housed in the jail and may have committed less serious offenses (R. 55152). The "absurd results" doctrine of statutory interpretation posits that when there are
two plausible readings of a statute, courts should choose the reading which avoids absurd
results. See, e ^ , Encon Utah LLC v. Fluor Ames Kraemer LLC. 2009 UT 7, ^ 73, 210
P.3d263.
The statutes at issue here, Utah Code Ann. §§ 78A-6-113(11) and 62A-7201(2)(a), supra, give rise to only one plausible reading: children whose are certified to
adult court or who are bound over to adult court through Serious Youth Offender cases
may be held in adult facilities. See id- Children such as Angilau, whose cases are
directly filed under 78A-6-701, are not permitted by Utah Code Ann. §§ 78A-6-113(11)
or 62A-7-201(2)(a) to be housed in the jail or adult facilities. See id.
Assuming arguendo that the statutes were open to two plausible interpretations,
see Encon, supra, the result of the statutory scheme is not absurd. Direct file children are
placed directly into the adult system by virtue of one politically-elected prosecutor's
choice to file an information, rather than a juvenile court petition.3 See Utah Code Ann. §

3

On January 26, 2009, District Attorney Lohra Miller explained the decision to
prosecute Angilau in adult court, in a widely televised and published press conference,
wherein she stated,
At 16 years old, because of his participation in a gang and the
activities that he engaged in on this particular day, he now faces the
12

78A-6-701. There is no judicial involvement in the choice of the forum selected by the
prosecutor, either in juvenile court or in district court. See id. Direct file children are not
entitled to an appeal of right. See Utah Code Ann. § 78A-6-704 (granting an appeal of
right from orders binding children over to adult court in certification and Serious Youth
Offender cases).
In contrast, Serious Youth Offender children are entitled to a probable cause and
retention hearing in the juvenile court, Utah Code Ann. § 78A-6-702, and an immediate
appeal of right to an appellate court sitting as a court of equity with its broadest scope of
appellate review upon being bound over to adult court. See Utah Code Ann. § 78A-6-

potential of spending the rest of his life in prison.
See R. 349-50. See also, e.g., http://www.ksl.com/?sid-5424474&autostart-v&nid-148.
This statement demonstrates that the statutory offense of murder was not the sole
determinant of her choice to file an information in adult court. Rather, it was apparently
primarily influenced by the perception that Angilau is a gang participant. There is no
evidence that Angilau participated in a gang. Rather, prior to being incarcerated, Angilau
was physically active in sports, working hard at school, and participated regularly in
family, scouting and church activities (R. 216-233, 545).
The Utah Commission on Criminal and Juvenile Justice studies "Minority
Overrepresentation in the Juvenile Justice System," "Race in Juvenile Sentencing in
Utah," and "Bootstrapping: Is It More Likely to Occur with Youth Who Are of Color
and/or from Low-Income Families?" provide empirical evidence of the unfair treatment
of children descending from people of the Pacific Islands and other racial minorities, and
children from low income families in our system, which discriminatory treatment begins
at the point of arrest. The studies are available on the Commission's webpage, or may be
found at http://www.justice.utah.gov/Research/Race/minorityjuvenile.pdf;
http://www.justice.utah.gov/Research/Race/RaceAnalysis.pdf; and
http://www.justice.utah.gov/Research/Race/Bootstrapping_2002.pdf. The studies are in
the second volume of the district court's pleadings file, at R. 367-534.
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704; In re L.G.W.. 641 P.2d 127, 132 (Utah 1982). Also in contrast to the direct file
children, children who are certified to stand trial as adults have the benefit of a more
rigorous inquiry and hearing in the juvenile court than the Serious Youth Offender
children receive, see Utah Code Ann. § 78A-6-703, and are also entitled to an appeal of
right to an appellate court sitting as a court of equity with its broadest scope of appellate
review upon being bound over to adult court. See Utah Code Ann. § 78A-6-704; In re
L.G.W.. 641 P.2d 127, 132 (Utah 1982).
It appears that the legislature's choice to exclude the direct file children from the
classes of children who may be housed in the jail is an effort to compensate for the
complete lack of judicial process, oversight and review of the elected prosecutor's choice
to file the children's cases by information, rather than by petition. While it is no
substitute for proper judicial assessment of whether a child belongs in adult court, the
legislature's result — that direct file children will not be placed in dangerous adult
facilities unless and until they are found guilty beyond a reasonable doubt by a jury and
sentenced to an adult facility - is not absurd.
In reading the direct file statute as an authorization to hold direct file children in
the jail (R. 552),4 the court violated fundamental precepts of statutory construction which

4

Utah Code Ann. § 78A-6-701 provides:
(1) The district court shall have exclusive original jurisdiction over
all persons 16 years of age or older charged by information or indictment
with:
(a) an offense which would be murder or aggravated
14

are essential to maintaining the integrity of judicial and legislative branch functions.
Under the structure of the Utah Constitution, it is the function of the legislature to
draft and enact specific and understandable laws, not the courts'. See Constitution of
Utah, Article VI § 1 and Article V § 1. The constitutional doctrine of separation of
powers logically requires the courts' fealty to the plain language of the laws enacted by
the legislature.
The preference for literalism in determining the effect of a statute is
based on the constitutional doctrine of separation of powers. The courts
owe fidelity to the will of the legislature. What a legislature says in the text

murder if committed by an adult; or
(b) an offense which would be a felony if committed
by an adult if the minor has been previously committed to a
secure facility as defined in Section 62A-7-101. This
Subsection (l)(b) shall not apply if the offense is committed
in a secure facility.
(2) When the district court has exclusive original jurisdiction over a
minor under this section, it also has exclusive original jurisdiction over the
minor regarding all offenses joined with the qualifying offense, and any
other offenses, including misdemeanors, arising from the same criminal
episode. The district court is not divested of jurisdiction by virtue of the fact
that the minor is allowed to enter a plea to, or is found guilty of, a lesser or
joined offense.
(3)(a) Any felony, misdemeanor, or infraction committed after the
offense over which the district court takes jurisdiction under Subsection (1)
or (2) shall be tried against the defendant as an adult in the district court or
justice court having jurisdiction.
(b) If the qualifying charge under Subsection (1)
results in an acquittal, a finding of not guilty, or a dismissal of
the charge in the district court, the juvenile court under
Section 78A-6-103 and the Division of Juvenile Justice
Services regain jurisdiction and any authority previously
exercised over the minor.
15

of a statute is considered the best evidence of the legislative intent or will.
Therefore, the courts are bound to give effect to the expressed intent of the
legislature.
Sutherland, Statutory Construction, § 46.03.
The goal of statutory interpretation is to determine and give effect to the intent of
the legislature, and the primary tools for the determination of the intent of the legislature
are reading and giving effect to the plain language enacted by the legislature. "The
doctrine is fundamental.. .that in arriving at the intention of the Legislature the courts
must give effect to the plain meaning of the language used to express the intention....
The plain and obvious meaning of the language must be adopted; anything else would be
an unwarranted assumption of legislative authority." State v. Davis 184 P. 161,
165 (Utah 1919). When interpreting a statute courts can "presume that the Legislature
used each term advisedly, and ... give effect to each term according to its ordinary and
accepted meaning." Versluis v. Guaranty Nat. Companies 842 P.2d 865, 867 (Utah
1992).
The statute at issue details the specific circumstances in which children may be
housed in adult facilities. See Utah Code Ann. § 68A-7-201. While some juveniles
charged under the Serious Youth Offender and certification statutes may be housed in
adult facilities in some circumstances, neither 68A-7-201 nor any other authorizes
children such as Angilau, whose cases are filed directly in adult court, to be housed in
adult facilities. The fact that the legislature opted not to include children with directly
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filed cases among those specifically authorized for detention in adult facilities
demonstrates legislative intent to exclude those children with directly filed cases from the
possibility of being housed in adult facilities. See, e.g.. Field v. Boyer Co., L.C., 952
P.2d 1078 (Utah 1998) (recognizing the maxim of statutory construction, expressio unius
est exclusio alterius" which means the expression of one thing implies the exclusion of
another); Hansen v. Wilkinson, 658 P.2d 1216, 1217 (Utah 1983) ("It probably is not
wholly inaccurate to suppose that ordinarily when people say one thing they do not mean
something else.") (quoting 2a C. Sands, Sutherland Statutory Construction, § 47.01 (4th
ed. 1973)).

2.

THE COURT'S RELIANCE ON MOHI WAS MISPLACED, AS
THE UNDERLYING STATUTE HAS SINCE BEEN AMENDED
AND NO LONGER AUTHORIZES DIRECT FILE CHILDREN
TO BE HELD IN ADULT FACILITIES.

The trial court relied on State v. Mohi 901 P.2d 991, 998-1004 (Utah 1995), to
hold that Angilau was properly housed in the jail, despite the fact that the statute in effect
at the time of Mohi, which permitted direct file children to be housed in the jail, was
amended by our legislature, and no longer permits direct file children to be housed in the
jail (R. 553-55).5

5

The court noted that in the statute in effect at the time of Mohi, like the
current statute, recognized that courts "may" order children housed in jail or other adult
facilities (R. 554). The court noted that in Mohi, this Court held that the permissive word
"may" did not permit courts to send children to facilities other than the jail or other adult
17

Utah law formerly permitted juveniles whose cases were filed directly in adult
court to be housed in the jail or other adult facility. See, e.g.. State v. Mohi, 901 P.2d
991, 1006 (Utah 1995)(discussing Utah Code Ann. § 78-3a-30(9) (Supp. 1994)).6
However, this statutory authorization was removed by the legislature in the postMohi amendments, which now only permit the incarceration of certified and Serious
Youth Offender children to be housed in adult facilities.7 Courts are not at liberty to
ignore the legislature's choice to excise provisions of Utah law. See, e,g., Sindt v.

facilities (R. 554, citing Mohi. 901 P.2d at 1006).
6

The statute governing the placement of juveniles in the jail at issue in Mohi

provided:
A child held for criminal proceedings under Section 78-3a-25 may be
detained in a jail or other place of detention used for adults charged with
crime.
Utah Code Ann. § 78-3a-30(9) (1994).
7

The statute asserted by the DA in the district court and relied on by the court as
justifying Angilau's incarceration in the jail, Section 62A-7-201(2)(a) provides:
(2)(a) Children charged by information or indictment with crimes as a
serious youth offender under Section 78A-6-702 or certified to stand trial as
an adult pursuant to Section 78A-6-703 may be detained in a jail or other
place of detention used for adults.
The current statute asserted by the Sheriff in district court, Utah Code Ann. § 78A-6113(11) similarly indicates:
(11) A minor held for criminal proceedings under Section 78A-6-702
or 78A-6--703 may be detained in a jail or other place of detention used for
adults charged with crime.
Angilau is not charged as a Serious Youth Offender under 78A-6-702. He has not
been certified to stand trial as an adult under 78A-6-703. He does not fall within the
classes who may be held in adult facilities pursuant to §§ 68A-7-201(2)(a) or 78A-6113(11).
18

Retirement Board. 2007 UT 16, ^ 13, 157 P.3d 797. Rather, such legislative action is
properly read as reflecting a legislative choice to grant or withdraw a right, id., here,
withdrawing the government's right to house these direct file children in adult facilities
and granting Angilau the right to be free from adult incarceration. Because the legislature
has omitted the direct file children from the statutes which specify that Serious Youth
Offenders and certified children may be housed in the jail, the courts are constitutionally
bound to honor that choice. See, e.g., Kennecott Copper Corp. v. Anderson, 514 P.2d
217, 219 (Utah 1973) ("It is often said that it should be assumed that all of the words used
in a statute were used advisedly and were intended to be given meaning and effect. For
the same reasons, the omissions should likewise be taken note of and given effect.")
(footnotes with citations omitted).

D.

THE COURT WAS INCORRECT IN RULING THAT THE DIRECT
FILE STATUTE HAD BEEN AMENDED TO DIVEST PROSECUTORS
OF UNCONSTITUTIONAL DISCRETION,8 AND IMPLICITLY
AUTHORIZED ANGILAU'S INCARCERATION IN THE JAIL.

The court reasoned that because the direct file statute was amended to comply with
State v. Moht 901 P.2d 991 (Utah 1995), to remove all prosecutorial discretion and to
require all murder charges brought against people sixteen years or older in district court,

8

The unconstitutionality of the direct filing statute is the subject of an interlocutory
appeal which this Court has agreed to hear in State v. Angilau, Case No. 20090538. This
Court has yet to rule on the motion to consolidate that appeal with the instant one.
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there was no need to explicitly mention direct file children in the statutes requiring
specific statutory authorization for incarceration of juveniles in adult facilities, Utah Code
Ann. §§ 62A-7-201 and 78A-6-113(11) (R. 553).
Utah Code Ann. § 62A-7-201(l) reflects a general statutory presumption against
the incarceration of juveniles in adult facilities and requires express statutory
authorization for such placements.9 Utah Code Ann. § 78A-6-113(11) does not include
direct file children charged under 78A-6-701 among the classes of children authorized to
be housed in adult facilities. It provides:
(11) A minor held for criminal proceedings under Section 78A-6-702
or 78A-6-703 may be detained in a jail or other place of detention used for
adults charged with crime.
The direct file statute does not provide specific statutory authorization to house
direct file children in the jail. It provides in full:
(1) The district court shall have exclusive original jurisdiction over
all persons 16 years of age or older charged by information or indictment
with:
(a) an offense which would be murder or aggravated
murder if committed by an adult; or

9

Subsection 1 provides in this regard:
(1) Children under 18 years of age, who are
apprehended by any officer or brought before any court for
examination under any provision of state law, may not be
confined in jails, lockups, or cells used for persons 18 years of
age or older who are charged with crime, or in secure
postadjudication correctional facilities operated by the
division, except as provided by specific statute and in
conformance with standards approved by the board.
20

(b) an offense which would be a felony if committed
by an adult if the minor has been previously committed to a
secure facility as defined in Section 62A-7-101. This
Subsection (l)(b) shall not apply if the offense is committed
in a secure facility.
(2) When the district court has exclusive original jurisdiction over a
minor under this section, it also has exclusive original jurisdiction over the
minor regarding all offenses joined with the qualifying offense, and any
other offenses, including misdemeanors, arising from the same criminal
episode. The district court is not divested of jurisdiction by virtue of the fact
that the minor is allowed to enter a plea to, or is found guilty of, a lesser or
joined offense.
(3)(a) Any felony, misdemeanor, or infraction committed after the
offense over which the district court takes jurisdiction under Subsection (1)
or (2) shall be tried against the defendant as an adult in the district court or
justice court having jurisdiction.
(b) If the qualifying charge under Subsection (1)
results in an acquittal, a finding of not guilty, or a dismissal of
the charge in the district court, the juvenile court under
Section 78A-6-103 and the Division of Juvenile Justice
Services regain jurisdiction and any authority previously
exercised over the minor.
The mere fact that the statute grants district courts jurisdiction over those children whose
cases are filed by information does nothing to authorize the housing of the direct file
children in the jail. See id.
Assuming that this were not the case, the trial court was in error in its belief that
the direct file statute had been amended since Mohi to remove the constitutional defect of
excessive prosecutorial discretion (R. 553).10 The direct file statute gives prosecutors

10

In Mohi, the Court accepted an interlocutory appeal raising various claims by
three juveniles, ultimately held that the direct filing statute at issue there was
unconstitutional because it provided unbridled prosecutorial discretion to direct file, and
remanded the cases for certification hearings. See 901 P.2d at 994-95 and 1006-07.
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wholly unguided discretion as to which children's cases will be filed directly in adult
court. Under 78A-6-701, prosecutors may direct file charges in adult court against those
16 and 17 year old children who are charged with murder or aggravated murder, or who
commit a felony after having been committed to a secure facility, but only if those
children are prosecuted by indictment or information. See id. Neither this statute nor any
other requires a prosecutor to charge these children by indictment or information. Rather,
prosecutors have full discretion to proceed in juvenile court by filing a petition under
Utah Code Ann. § 78A-6-103(l)(a), which provides:
(1) Except as otherwise provided by law, the juvenile court has exclusive
original jurisdiction in proceedings concerning:
(a) a child who has violated any federal, state, or local law or municipal
ordinance or a person younger than 21 years of age who has violated any
law or ordinance before becoming 18 years of age, regardless of where the
violation occurred, excluding offenses in Subsection 78A-7-106(2)[.u]
By choosing to file an information or an indictment under 78A-6-701, prosecutors not
only select the charges, they select the forum. See Utah Code Ann. § 78A-6-701.
The certification statute, § 78A-6-602(3), likewise recognizes prosecutorial
discretion to proceed by petition in direct file cases such as Angilau's by specifying the
Serious Youth Offender cases as the only ones which are not subject to a prosecutor's
discretionary request for certification. It provides:

n

Section 78A-7-106 governs those misdemeanors and infractions which are
subject to prosecution injustice courts.
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Except as provided in Section 78A-6-702, in the case of a minor 14
years of age or older, the county attorney, district attorney, or attorney
general may commence an action by filing a criminal information and a
motion requesting the juvenile court to waive its jurisdiction and certify the
minor to the district court.
Section 78A-6-702, the only exception mentioned in 78A-6-602(3), is the Serious Youth
Offender statute. The fact that the legislature opted not to include the direct file statute
cases among those specifically excluded from the certification process demonstrates a
legislative intent to include them as eligible for certification, and original filing in
juvenile court. Cfi, Field v. Bover Co.. L.C.. 952 P.2d 1078 (Utah 1998) (recognizing the
maxim of statutory construction, expressio unius est exclusio alterius" which means the
expression of one thing implies the exclusion of another); Hansen v. Wilkinson, 658 P.2d
1216, 1217 (Utah 1983) ("It probably is not wholly inaccurate to suppose that ordinarily
when people say one thing they do not mean something else.") (quoting 2a C. Sands,
Sutherland Statutory Construction, § 47.01 (4th ed. 1973)).
The direct file statute, supra, does not require the filing of an indictment or
information, but provides district court jurisdiction in cases wherein the prosecutor opts to
file those pleadings, rather than to proceed by petition. See 78A-6-701(l), supra. In
contrast, the Serious Youth Offender statute requires prosecutors to file informations
which result in adult prosecution unless the juvenile court retains the case after the
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preliminary hearing.12 The contrasting language of the statutes with regard to the
mandatory nature of the filing of an information in Serious Youth Offender cases, versus
the permissive filing of an information in direct file cases, is properly interpreted
according to the plain language enacted by the legislature. Versluis v. Guaranty Nat.
Companies 842 P.2d 865, 867 (Utah 1992)(when interpreting a statute the Court can
"presume that the Legislature used each term advisedly, and ... give effect to each term
according to its ordinary and accepted meaning.").
By reviewing the floor debates on Senate Bill 111 in the 1995 General Session of
the 51st Legislature,13 the Court may confirm that the senate adopted the subsection of the
statute automatically transferring cases of 16 and 17 year olds charged by information or
indictment with murder and aggravated murder in an effort to address the excessive
prosecutorial discretion at issue in State v. Mohi. 901 P.2d 991 (Utah 1995), and to
expedite the arrival at the prison of those dangerous juveniles who would end up there
eventually. See R. 352, 354. However, this bill was passed before the Mohi opinion was
issued, and thus the lawmakers did not benefit from or account for the Court's analysis of

12

Section 78A-6-702 provides in that regard,
(1) Any action filed by a county attorney, district attorney, or
attorney general charging a minor 16 years of age or older with a felony
shall be by criminal information and filed in the juvenile court if the
information charges any of the following offenses: ...
(emphasis added).
13

Our courts routinely refer to the floor debates in ascertaining the impetus behind
legislative actions. See, e ^ , Soriano v. GrauL 2008 UT App 188, | 2 , 186 P.3d 960.
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the unconstitutionality of the direct file statutes in effect prior to the amendments. The
house debates do not reflect a clear understanding by our representatives of the
constitutional problem with the statute they enacted. See R. 360, 366.
Under the current direct filing statute, prosecutors enjoy greater discretion than
they did under the pre-Mohi direct file statute. The current direct filing scheme contains
no recall provision, wherein a court reviews the prosecutor's choice to direct file a
juvenile's case in adult court. Thus, the current statute provides more unchecked
discretion than was present in the Mohi statute, and less judicial involvement than was
provided in, and key to the constitutionality of, prior versions of Utah's direct file
statutes. See, State inreN.H.B.. 777 P.2d 487, 490-92 (Utah App. 1989) (upholding
direct filing statute because, inter alia, the recall hearings provided the right to counsel, a
record of the proceedings, a hearing, and appropriate findings); State v. Bell 785 P.2d
390, 402-404 (Utah 1989) (in upholding direct filing statute, which was contingent on the
juvenile court's determination that recall to juvenile court was inappropriate, the court
recognized, "[0]ur decision is supported by the crucial fact that under the statute in
question, the juvenile court has the right and retains the power in the final regard to
'recall control' over the child and bring him or her back into the juvenile system.").
Like the statute in effect at the time of Mohi, there is no provision in the current
direct file statute that requires any investigation, inquiry, hearing, statement of rationale,
or judicial decision or appellate review of any decision, to properly adjudicate the
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propriety of prosecuting Angilau or any other child charged in adult court. But see, e.g..
State in re Clatterbuck, 700 P.2d 1076, 1078 (Utah 1985) (recognize the critical
importance of the decision of whether a child will be transferred to adult court, and the
concomitant need to afford the child and our society appropriate procedural protections
in the decision making process); State v. Mohl 901 P.2d 991, 995-996 (Utah 1995)
(same), and State inreN.H.B., 777 P.2d 487, 490 (Utah App. 1989) (same); Kent v.
United States, 383 U.S. 541, 553 (1966) (same).
In addition, the current direct file statute does not contemplate an appeal of right
from the child's arrival in the adult system, which appeals are provided as a matter of
right for children whose cases arrive in adult court through certification from the juvenile
court or through a Serious Youth Offender bindover order from juvenile court. See Utah
Code Ann. §78A-6-704. In Utah, our appellate courts sit as courts of equity, and afford
the broadest scope of appellate review in appeals from juvenile court. In re L.G.W., 641
P.2d 127, 132 (Utah 1982). Under the direct file statute, however, there is no judicial or
appellate review of the prosecutor's decision to place the children in the adult court
system.
A completely discretionary decision from one politically elected prosecutor is no
substitute for the proper Kent inquiry and judicial determination and appellate review of
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the critical question as to whether a child should be prosecuted as an adult or in juvenile
court.14 As the Court succinctly stated in Mohi,
"[T]here is no place in our system of law for reaching a result of such
tremendous consequences [prosecuting children in the adult system]
without ceremony-without a hearing, without effective assistance of
counsel, without a statement of reason. It is inconceivable that a court of
justice dealing with adults would proceed in this manner. It would be
extraordinary if society's special concern for children ... permitted this
procedure."
Mohi. 901 P.2d at 996 n.2, quoting Kent. 383 U.S. at 554.

14

On January 26, 2009, District Attorney Lohra Miller explained the decision to
prosecute Angilau in adult court, in a widely televised and published press conference,
wherein she stated,
At 16 years old, because of his participation in a gang and the
activities that he engaged in on this particular day, he now faces the
potential of spending the rest of his life in prison.
See R. 349-50. See also, e.g., http://www.ksl.com/?sid-5424474&autostart-\-&nid-148.
This statement demonstrates that the statutory offense of murder was not the sole
determinant of her choice to file an information in adult court. Rather, it was apparently
primarily influenced by the perception that Angilau is a gang participant. There is no
evidence that Angilau participated in a gang. Rather, prior to being incarcerated, Angilau
was physically active in sports, working hard at school, and participated regularly in
family, scouting and church activities (R. 216-233, 545).
The Utah Commission on Criminal and Juvenile Justice studies "Minority
Overrepresentation in the Juvenile Justice System," "Race in Juvenile Sentencing in
Utah," and "Bootstrapping: Is It More Likely to Occur with Youth Who Are of Color
and/or from Low-Income Families?" provide empirical evidence of the unfair treatment
of children descending from people of the Pacific Islands and other racial minorities, and
children from low income families in our system, which discriminatory treatment begins
at the point of arrest. The studies are available on the Commission's webpage, or may be
found at http://www.justice.utah.gov/Research/Race/minorityjuvenile.pdf;
http://www.justice.utah.gov/Research/Race/RaceAnalysis.pdf; and
http://www.justice.utah.gov/Research/Race/Bootstrapping_2002.pdf. The studies are in
the second volume of the district court's pleadings file, at R. 367-534.
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Because there are no legislative guidelines limiting the prosecutors' exercise of
unbridled discretion to direct file these cases, the current direct filing scheme is
unconstitutional under Mohl supra, and does nothing to support the incarceration of
direct file children in adult facilities. See id.

E.

THE SALT LAKE COUNTY JAIL DOES NOT COMPLY WITH
THE STANDARDS NECESSARY TO SAFE AND HUMANE
HOUSING OF CHILDREN.

Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-104 requires all provisions of the criminal code to be
interpreted so as to "[p]revent arbitrary or oppressive treatment of persons accused or
convicted of offenses." Consistent with this general philosophy, the legislature has
codified the obligation of the Department of Human Services to enact administrative rules
to insure the safe and humane incarceration of children. See Utah Code Ann. §§ 62-1111(1) (permitting department of human services 1o enact administrative rules for social
services), and 62A-7-201.15 Subsection (1) of 62A-7-201 forbids minors under the age of

This statute provides in full:
(1) Children under 18 years of age, who are apprehended by any officer or
brought before any court for examination under any provision of state law,
may not be confined in jails, lockups, or cells used for persons 18 years of
age or older who are charged with crime, or in secure postadjudication
correctional facilities operated by the division, except as provided by
specific statute and in conformance with standards approved by the board.
(2)(a) Children charged by information or indictment with crimes as a
serious youth offender under Section 78A-6-702 or certified to stand trial as
an adult pursuant to Section 78A-6-703 may be detained in a jail or other
28

place of detention used for adults.
(b) Children detained in adult facilities under Section
78A-6-702 or 78A-6-703 prior to a hearing before a
magistrate, or under Subsection 78A-6-113(3), may only be
held in certified juvenile detention accommodations in
accordance with rules promulgated by the division. Those
rules shall include standards for acceptable sight and sound
separation from adult inmates. The division certifies facilities
that are in compliance with the division's standards.
(3) In areas of low density population, the division may, by rule,
approve juvenile holding accommodations within adult facilities that have
acceptable sight and sound separation. Those facilities shall be used only
for short-term holding purposes, with a maximum confinement of six hours,
for children alleged to have committed an act which would be a criminal
offense if committed by an adult. Acceptable short-term holding purposes
are: identification, notification of juvenile court officials, processing, and
allowance of adequate time for evaluation of needs and circumstances
regarding release or transfer to a shelter or detention facility.
(4) Children who are alleged to have committed an act which would
be a criminal offense if committed by an adult, may be detained in holding
rooms in local law enforcement agency facilities for a maximum of two
hours, for identification or interrogation, or while awaiting release to a
parent or other responsible adult. Those rooms shall be certified by the
division, according to the division's rules. Those rules shall include
provisions for constant supervision and for sight and sound separation from
adult inmates.
(5) Willful failure to comply with any of the provisions of this
section is a class B misdemeanor.
(6)(a) The division is responsible for the custody and detention of
children under 18 years of age who require detention care prior to trial or
examination, or while awaiting assignment to a home or facility, as a
dispositional placement under Subsection 78A-6-117(2)(f)(i) or 78A-61101(3)(a), and of youth offenders under Subsection 62A-7-504(8).
(b) The division shall provide standards for custody or
detention under Subsections (2)(b), (3), and (4), and shall
determine and set standards for conditions of care and
confinement of children in detention facilities.
29

18 to be housed in adult facilities absent specific statutory authorization and, and requires
those adult facilities which house adults unless two conditions are met: 1) there is specific
statutory authorization, and 2), the incarceration of minors complies with rules
promulgated by Ihe Board of Juvenile Justice Services under the Department of Human
Services. See id. and 62A-7-101(2) (defining the board as the Board of Juvenile Justice
Services). Accordingly, the Department of Human Services has enacted administrative
rules which are necessary to the safe and humane incarceration of children. See,
generally, Utah Admin. Code R547-3-1 through 3, and R547-7.
While there is no statutory authorization for direct file children to be held in the
jail, as is required by Utah Code Ann. §62A-7-201( 1), supra, R547-3-1 through 3 sets
forth standards which must be met in the case of any incarceration of a minor in an adult
facility, and expressly mentions direct file children as coming within its ambit. See R5473-3(1).16 According to this provision of the administrative code, direct file children such

(c) All other custody or detention shall be provided by the division,
or by contract with a public or private agency willing to undertake
temporary custody or detention upon agreed terms, or in suitable premises
distinct and separate from the general jails, lockups, or cells used in law
enforcement and corrections systems.
16

Administrative rules passed by administrative agencies do have the force of
law, e ^ , Robinson v. State, 2001 UT 21, ^ 8 n.l, 20 P.3d 396. However, they do not
constitute specific statutory authorization required by the legislature for incarceration of
children in adult facilities, because they were not enacted by legislators, who are
accountable to the electorate. See, e.g., Utah Hotel Company v. Industrial Commission,
151 P.2d 467, 471 (Utah 1944). To the degree that administrative regulations conflict
with statutes, the regulations are considered nullities. See id.
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as Angilau may be held in an adult jail only if it is certified by the State Division of
Juvenile Justice Services. See R. 547-3-3(3). The children who are housed in the jail are
to be separated from adult inmates to the extent that adult and child inmates cannot see,
hear or communicate with one another. See Utah Administrative Code R547-3(4), R5477-2(3). Sight and sound separation between adult and juvenile inmates is likewise
required by statute. See Utah Code Ann. § 62A-7-201(2)(b). The standards for limited
incarceration of children in adult facilities require "constant on-site supervision through
visual or TV monitoring and audio two way communication." See Utah Administrative
Code R547-3(10)(b), R547-7-3(6)(b). Under the regulations which govern the
incarceration of children in adult facilities, someone employed by the government should
be making "frequent personal checks to maintain communication with the juvenile and
prevent panic and feelings of isolation." Utah Admin. Code R 547-3(10)(c), R547-73(6)(d).
The foregoing administrative rules have the effect of law, as do the statutes. See,
SS» Utah Code Ann. § 63G-3-202(2); Robinson v. State. 2001 UT 21, ^ 8 n.l, 20 P.3d
396. The Sheriff and his staff are obliged to obey the law which specifically governs the
jail they run. See, e.g., Utah Code Ann. § 63G-3-202(2), Robinson.
Consistent with Chief Cook's affidavit to this effect (R. 538-39), the trial court
tacitly recognized that the adult jail is not compliant with Juvenile Jail Standards with
regard to Angilau (R. 555). The court reasoned that this is permissible, because Angilau
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is charged as an adult, is not within the jurisdiction of the juvenile courts,17 or within the
jurisdiction of Juvenile Justice Services, and is thus not entitled to be treated as a juvenile
under the standards promulgated by the Juvenile Justice Services Board (R. 555-56).
It is true that because the DA chose to file Angilau's case by information, rather
than by petition, the juvenile court presently has no jurisdiction over Angilau in his
criminal case. Utah Code Ann. § 78A-6-701. This fact does nothing to absolve the
Sheriff and jail staff from their legal duties to comply with Juvenile Jail Standards. See,
Robinson, 63G-3-202(2), supra.
It is also true that the Division of Juvenile Justice Services has jurisdiction over
and responsibility for children committed to it under 78A-6-117, the statute governing
juvenile court dispositions. See Utah Code Ann. § 62A-7-102.18 However, the Division's
17

The court read Utah Code Ann. § 78A-6-103, the statute governing juvenile court
jurisdiction, as if it conferred jurisdiction over juveniles "not otherwise subject to the
district court provided in Sections 78A-6-701, -702, or -703. Actually, § 78A-6-103
makes no reference to the direct file statute, but instead provides:
(1) Except as otherwise provided by law, the juvenile court has exclusive
original jurisdiction in proceedings concerning:
(a) a child who has violated any federal, state, or local law or
municipal ordinance or a person younger than 21 years of age
who has violated any law or ordinance before becoming 18
years of age, regardless of where the violation occurred,
excluding offenses in Subsection 78A-7-106(2)[.]
78A-7-106(2) discusses the jurisdiction of justice of the peace courts over some
misdemeanors.

18

That statute provides:
There is created the Division of Juvenile Justice Services within the
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jurisdiction over those children in juvenile court does nothing to negate or preclude the
Division's or Board's statutory authority and responsibility to promulgate standards
which govern the incarceration of all children under the age of 18, including Angilau, in
adult facilities. See, e.g., 62A-7-201, supra.
The trial court found that under 62A-7-201(l), (2)(a) and (6)(b), direct file
children serious youth offender children and certified children are excluded from the
Juvenile Jail Standards (R. 556). The court found that the Juvenile Jail Standards apply
only apply to certified and Serious Youth Offender children when they are awaiting a
hearing under §§78A-6-702 and 703, to children in low population density areas, and to
children held less than two hours (R. 555-56). The court's statutory interpretation does
not square with the plain language of the statute, which makes no mention of direct file
children or direct file statute, and does not exclude those direct file children from the
Juvenile Jail Standards or rules. See 62A-7-201, passim. Nor does the court's ruling
square with the portions of the statute governing other children charged as adults, which
authorize the housing of certified and Serious Youth Offender children in the jail only if
the jail is compliant with standards promulgated by the Juvenile Justices Board, 62A-7201(1), and which require these certified and Serious Youth Offender children to be held
in "certified juvenile detention accommodations" in accordance with division rules if the

department, under the administration and supervision of the executive
director, and under the policy direction of the board. The division has
jurisdiction over all youth committed to it pursuant to Section 78A-6-117.
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children have not yet had a hearing before a magistrate. See id. Finally, the court's
analysis does not square with the administrative code provisions, which expressly do
apply to direct file children held in adult facilities, see, e ^ , R.547-3 (3) through (25), and
547-7, supra, but which are not obeyed by the jail (R. 543-44, 538-39).
Because there is no specific statutory authorization, Angilau and other direct file
children should not be in the jail at all. Utah Code Ann. §62A-7-201(l) and (5). The
failure and/or inability of the jail administration to comply with the legislativelymandated administrative rules designed to insure the safe and humane treatment of
children in adult facilities (R. 543-44, 538-39) compounds the illegality of their
incarceration, and justifies relief from this Court. See id.

II.

THE INCARCERATION OF ANGILAU IN THE JAIL
VIOLATES THE CONSTITUTIONS.
A.

THE INCARCERATION OF ANGILAU IN THE JAIL VIOLATES
HIS CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS TO DUE PROCESS, EQUAL
PROTECTION AND UNIFORM OPERATION OF LAWS.

Angilau's incarceration in the jail in violation of the unambiguous statute and
administrative code regulations discussed above violates his constitutional rights to equal
protection and uniform operation of the laws. See Constitution of Utah, Article I § 24,
United States Constitution, Amendment XIV.19 See generally, e.g., Wood v. University

19

Apparency because the court recognized no violations of the codes, the court did
not address the majority of Angilau's arguments that Angilau's being held in the jail in
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of Utah Medical Center. 67 P.3d 436, 449 2002 UT 134,ffi|33-34 (Utah
2002)(recognizing that state constitution requires all laws apply uniformly to similarly
situated people, and that the federal constitution requires laws to apply in similar fashion
to similarly situated individuals). Particularly because Angilau is presumed innocent as a
matter of law, incarcerating him in the adult jail without complying with the Juvenile Jail
Standards is accurately characterized as punishment, and is excessive and not merely
necessary or incidental to a legitimate government purpose. Thus, his incarceration
establishes the due process violations under the state and federal constitutions. See
Wickham v. Fisher. 629 P.2d 896, 901 (Utah 1981) (citing Bell v. Wolfish. 441 U.S. 520,
538 (1979), and noting that the due process clauses of the state and federal constitutions
are violated if people are punished prior to the adjudication of guilt). As the court
explained in D.B. v. Tewksburv. 545 F.Supp.896 (D. Ore. 1982), in holding that the
detention of children in adult jails under the Oregon statutory scheme in effect at the time
violated the Fourteenth Amendment,
The supervisors at jails are guards-uot guardians. Jails hold
convicted criminals and adults charged with crimes. Jails are prisons, with
social stigmas. Children identify with their surroundings. They may readily
perceive themselves as criminals, for who goes to jail except for criminals?
A jail is not a place where a truly concerned natural parent would lodge his

violation of the unambiguous statute and administrative code regulations also violates his
constitutional rights to due process, equal protection, and uniform operation of the laws.
See Constitution of Utah, Article I §§ 7 and 24, United States Constitution, Amendment
XIV (R. 556-57).
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or her child for care and guidance. A jail is not a place where the state can
constitutionally lodge its children under the guise of parens patriae.
Id. at 907.

B.

THIS COURT SHOULD RECOGNIZE THE CONSTITUTIONAL
RIGHTS OF JUVENILES TO BE ADJUDICATED IN JUVENILE
COURT ABSENT A HEARING JUSTIFYING PROSECUTION IN THE
ADULT SYSTEM.

The trial court found that there was no federal due process violation involved in
Angilau's incarceration in the jail because he has no right to be tried as a juvenile (R.
556-57). An incomplete reading of old Utah cases might give one the impression that
the juvenile courts exist by virtue of legislative grace, and that children may be
prosecuted in adult court anytime, without a hearing to determine the propriety of the
forum. See, e^g, Burnham v. Havward. 663 P.2d 65, 67 (Utah 1983), citing State in re
Atcheson, 575 P.2d 181 (Utah 1978).
In dictum, the Mohi Court indicated that the legislature could constitutionally opt
to remove a group of children from the classification of juvenile offenders and could
thereby permit the prosecution of those children in adult court without providing them a
hearing. See id., 901 P.2d at 1005. In footnotes 14, 19 and 24, however, the Mohi Court
repeatedly drew attention to Tenth Circuit authority, Kellev v. Kaiser. 992 F.2d 1509 (10l
Cir. 1993), which recognizes that once a state creates a juvenile court system, the federal
constitution requires a Kent hearing as a constitutional requirement of any adult court
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prosecution. See Mohi. 901 P.2d at 1001 n.14, 1003 n.19, and 1005 n.24., dtrng Kaiser,
992 F.2d at 1515 ("Having created the juvenile court system, under Kent, it is the State's
decision to seek to treat a juvenile as an adult that, in and of itself triggers the need for a
hearing.").
Carefully considered opinions recognize the critical importance of the decision of
whether a child will be transferred to adult court, and the concomitant need to afford the
child and our society appropriate procedural protections in the decision making process.
E.g., State in re Clatterbuck, 700 P.2d 1076,1078 (Utah 1985); State v. Mohi, 901 P.2d
991, 995-996 (Utah 1995), and State in reN.H.B.. 777 P.2d 487, 490 (Utah App. 1989),
citing Kent v. United States. 383 U.S. 541, 553 (1966). Such a decision must be
premised on a thorough investigation, comply with statutory directives, and be
sufficiently detailed to insure thorough appellate review. See Clatterbuck and Kent,
supra.
The time has come for this Court to recognize that all children do have a
constitutional right to be prosecuted in juvenile court, and that the right may be revoked
only after due process is afforded. Such a right would properly be premised on the
Federal Due Process Clause, see Kent, and the Equal Protection Clause, discussed further
herein. Such a right flows naturally from and should be grounded in several Utah
Constitutional guarantees. Article I § 7 of the Utah Constitution, the due process
provision, has previously been interpreted to require a full panoply of procedural rights in
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contexts such as this one, wherein both life and liberty are at stake. See, e.g.,
Christiansen v. Harris, supra. The lives and liberties of our children are no less valuable
than those of adults, and the determination of whether their cases are adjudicated in adult
or juvenile court has major impact on their liberty, and may also jeopardize their lives.
See Matter of N.H.B. and Katz-Levi article, supra.
Article I § 9 of the Utah Constitution is a suitable source for a child's
constitutional right to have his or her case adjudicated in the juvenile court.
The history of this constitutional provision reflects that it was designed to protect
arrestees from inhumane detention. Official Report of the Proceedings and Debates of
the Convention Assembled at Salt Lake City on the Fourth Day of March, 1895, to Adopt
a Constitution for the State of Utah 257-58 (1898) (object of unnecessary rigor clause
protects "persons in jail if they shall be treated inhumanely while they are in prison.").
Our Courts likewise recognize that the guarantee against unnecessarily rigorous treatment
applies to the treatment of arrestees and inmates and protects them against unnecessary
abuse. Rg,, Bott v. DeLand, 922 P.2d 732, 737 (Utah 1996), overruled in part on other
grounds by Spademan v. Bd. of Educ. of Box Elder County Sch. Dist, 2000 UT 87, 16
P.3d 533. Bott demonstrates in the context of an inmate medical malpractice suit that the
"unnecessary rigor" inquiry focuses on whether a particular practice is necessary, or
whether it is needlessly harsh, dehumanizing or degrading. Id. at 740. Unnecessary rigor
is "treatment which is clearly excessive or deficient and unjustified," as distinguished
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from the standard irritations and inconveniences of prison life. Id. at 741. Examples of
unnecessary rigor include unnecessary exposure to "increased risk of serious harm,"
Dexter v.Bosko, 2008 UT 29, ^ 19, 184 P.3d 592, requiring complete silence from
inmates, id. at ^f 19, or failure to provide timely medical care after receiving numerous
requests from an inmate, id., citing Bott, supra. Classifications which remove children
from juvenile court and risk their placement in adult detention facilities without regard to
their actual cases and circumstances are by nature overbroad and unduly harsh, and
dehumanize and degrade those individual children who need and deserve to be protected
by the juvenile court system. Recognizing an Article I section 9 right of children to be
prosecuted in juvenile court absent a thorough procedural inquiry would thus serve the
salutary constitutional goals of preventing unnecessary rigor and cruelty in the
prosecution of children.
The uniform operation of laws provision, Article I § 24, is properly brought to bear
to insure that all similarly situated children are treated equally by the laws, and that the
legislature does not create unreasonable distinctions in the law, or create laws which
classify people in a manner that does not reasonably further statutory goals. See, e.g.,
Malan v. Lewis, 693 P.2d 661 (Utah 1984). All statutory goals of the juvenile court are
facilitated by adjudicating all children's cases in that court, unless a full Kent inquiry
establishes that they and their cases are not suited to adjudication in that forum. See Utah
Code Ann. § 78A-6-102(5).
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The constitutional provision forbidding the enactment of special or private laws,
Article VI § 26, would be an excellent source of a constitutional right of all children to be
treated in the juvenile courts, because that provision forbids the legislature to enact laws
that create unnatural classifications which separate out people who are not legitimately
particularized or separated from, the group of which they are a natural or intrinsic part.
See, e.g., Utah Farm Bureau Insurance Company v. Utah Insurance Guarantee
Association, 564 P.2d 751, 754 (Utah 1977). Treating children as a natural group, as
determined by the biological and physiological fact of their brain development,
see Simmons briefs, who have a right to have their cases adjudicated in that Court absent
a full inquiry indicating that they are not suited to be there, honors the letter and spirit of
Article VI § 26.
Finally, children's constitutional right to be treated as children by our laws and our
courts might well be premised on Article I §27 of the Utah Constitution, which
recognizes that "[fjrequent recurrence to fundamental principles is essential to the
security of individual rights and the perpetuity of free government." This State prides
itself on providing for its children in a civilized manner, and has a well-developed
juvenile court system to protect its children and strengthen their family units. See, e.g..
In re Tanner, 549 P.2d 703, 705 (Utah 1976); Anderson v. Anderson, 416 P.2d 308, 309310 (Utah 1966)., and Utah Code Ann. §78A-6-102(5). This State must secure the
individual rights of its children and their families by formally and constitutionally
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protecting the right of children to be prosecuted in juvenile court, unless a thorough and
proper inquiry and adjudication calls for prosecution in the adult system. As the Court
succinctly stated in Kent,
[TJhere is no place in our system of law for reaching a result of such
tremendous consequences [prosecuting children in the adult system]
without ceremony-without a hearing, without effective assistance of
counsel, without a statement of reason. It is inconceivable that a court of
justice dealing with adults would proceed in this manner. It would be
extraordinary if society's special concern for children ... permitted this
procedure.
Kent, 383 U.S. at 554.

C.

THE DIRECT FILING STATUTE WAS NOT AMENDED TO REMOVE
PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION AND DOES NOTHING TO
ESTABLISH A RATIONAL BASIS FOR HOLDING ANGILAU IN THE
JAIL.

The court rejected uniform operation of laws and equal protection challenges,
finding the classification of minors as adults reasonable because the direct file statute,
62A-7-201, purportedly gives prosecutors no discretion to charge children anywhere but
adult court (R. 557-58). As detailed above, under 78A-6-701, prosecutors may direct file
charges in adult court against those 16 and 17 year old children who are charged with
murder or aggravated murder, or who commit a felony after having been committed to a
secure facility, but only if those children are prosecuted by indictment or information.
The statutory scheme gives prosecutors no guidance, but instead gives them unfettered
41

discretion to choose between filing an information in adult court, or a petition in juvenile
court. See Point IC of this brief, supra.
Angilau was housed in Detention from January 21, 2009 to January 26, 2009,
without incident. He did nothing to endanger any child or the public while he was in
Detention, and there is no evidence that he poses a threat to anyone if he were returned to
Detention or released to Pretrial. Nonetheless, the trial court's equal protection analysis
reasoned that children charged with more serious offenses under the direct file,
certification and Serious Youth Offender statutes should be housed in the jail, in order to
protect children charged with less serious offenses in detention from the children being
prosecuted as adults (R. 558).
It is not necessary to hold direct file and other children in the jail illegally, on the
assumption that all children charged with but presumed innocent of certain offenses pose
dangers requiring incarceration in adult jails. Our legislature has actually provided for
situations which are not present here, in which juvenile offenders are too dangerous to
house in juvenile facilities. When children pose dangers to other children in detention,
Utah Code Ann.§ 78A-6-113(8)(b), provides that a court may enter an order transferring
the child to a jail or other facility, after providing detailed reasons for the order.20
20

The statute provides:

(b) A child 16 years of age or older whose conduct or condition endangers
the safety or welfare of others in the detention facility for children may, by
court order that specifies the reasons, be detained in another place of
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D.

THE INCARCERATION OF ANGILAU IN THE JAIL CONSTITUTES
UNNECESSARY RIGOROUS TREATMENT.

In rejecting Angilau's contention that his incarceration in the jail violates Article I
§ 9 of the Utah Constitution, the court recognized that a sixteen year old might be less
physically, mentally and emotionally mature than older prisoners (R. 560). However, the
court found no undue rigor, despite the relevant facts: Angilau is sixteen years old and
was held for months in maximum security, where he spent 23 hours a day "in frequent
solitude" in a cell with one other inmate, was routinely housed with and released to
recreate with inmates who were more than twice his age and who were charged with
and/or convicted of serious felony offenses (R. 560-61).
The incarceration of Angilau in the adult jail does violate his state constitutional
right against unnecessarily rigorous treatment. Article I § 9 of the Constitution of Utah
provides,
Excessive bail shall not be required; excessive fines shall not be
imposed; nor shall cruel and unusual punishments be inflicted. Persons
arrested or imprisoned shall not be treated with unnecessary rigor.

confinement considered appropriate by the court, including a jail or other
place of confinement for adults. However, a secure youth corrections
facility is not an appropriate place of confinement for detention purposes
under this section.
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The history of this constitutional provision reflects that it was designed to protect
arrestees from inhumane detention. Official Report of the Proceedings and Debates of
the Convention Assembled at Salt Lake City on the Fourth Day of March, 1895, to Adopt
a Constitution for the State of Utah 257-58 (1898) (object of unnecessary rigor clause
protects "persons in jail if they shall be treated inhumanely while they are in prison.").
Our courts likewise recognize that the guarantee against unnecessarily rigorous treatment
applies to the treatment of arrestees and protects them against unnecessary abuse. E.g.,
Bott v. DeLand, 922 P.2d 732, 737 (Utah 1996), overruled in part on other grounds by
Spackman v. Bd. of Educ. of Box Elder County Sch. Dist, 2000 UT 87, 16 P.3d 533.
Bott demonstrates in the context of an inmate medical malpractice suit that the
"unnecessary rigor" inquiry focuses on whether a particular practice is necessary, or
whether it is needlessly harsh, dehumanizing or degrading. Id. at 740. Unnecessary rigor
is "treatment which is clearly excessive or deficient and unjustified," as distinguished
from the standard irritations and inconveniences of prison life. Id. at 741. Examples of
unnecessary rigor include unnecessary exposure to "increased risk of serious harm,"
Dexter v. Bosko, 2008 UT 29, ^ 19, 184 P.3d 592, requiring complete silence from
inmates, id. at Tj ] 9„ or failure to provide timely medical care after receiving numerous
requests from an inmate, kl-> citing Bott, supra.
Restraining Angilau in the adult jail, particularly because the Juvenile Jail
Standards are not or cannot be met, constitutes unnecessarily rigorous treatment. His
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placement with adult inmates and the lack of constant supervision (R. 543-45) not only
violate our statute and administrative regulations, supra, they put him at a substantially
increased risk of serious harm. See Dexter, supra. See also Katz Levi, "State v. Mohi:
State Sanctioned Abuse," 10 Journal of Law and Family Studies 173, 174-76 and
accompanying notes (2007) (explaining how incarcerating children in adult jails harms
children, and increases the risk of suicide). His placement in maximum security, where
he was held 23 hours a day in a cell with one other inmate, only to be released to recreate
with adult maximum security inmates, particularly when he is denied the opportunity to
visit or speak with his family members (R. 543-45), constituted unduly rigorous and
violates Article I § 9 of the Utah Constitution. See Bott, supra.

CONCLUSION
This Court should hold that the incarceration of Angilau in the jail is illegal, and
should order his immediate release.
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ADDENDUM

RULING OF THE TRIAL COURT DENYING RELIEF

r*.jj

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL^DISTRMTLAKE COUNT
Y
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF tfi
PutM Clerk

RICKY ANGILAU,

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND
ORDER
Petitioner,
Case No. 090903982

vs.
STATE OF UTAH and SHERIFF JAMES M.
WINDER,
Respondents.

Judge Vernice Trease

THIS CASE IS BEFORE THE COURT on Petitioner's Petition for Extraordinary Relief and
Request for Immediate Temporary Relief filed on March 10, 2009. The State and Sheriff Winder
each submitted memoranda in opposition and Petitioner replied. On July 10, 2009, a hearing was
convened to allow Petitioner and Respondents an opportunity to present their evidence. Petitioner
was present, as were his attorneys Ronald Yengich, Elizabeth Hunt. The State was represented by
George Vo-Duc and Aaron Flater, and Sheriff Winder was represented by David Johnson. All of
the parties opted to submit the issues raised in the petition upon memoranda filed, oral argument and
the affidavits of Petitioner and Rollin Cook. The court has carefully considered the oral arguments
presented by counsel and thoroughly reviewed the parties' memoranda, the relevant case law, and
all applicable rules and statutory provisions. Now being fully advised, the court makes the following
ruling denying Petitioner's petition for extraordinary relief.

BACKGROUND
Petitioner was 16 years old when he was arrested on January 21, 2009 after allegedly firing

a gun into a crowd and killing one boy. He was subsequently charged on January 26,2009 with one
count of murder, and other offenses, under Utah's direct-file statute. See Utah Code Ann. § 78A-6701. The court denied Petitioner's Motion to Dismiss Information for Lack of Jurisdiction in the
criminal matter, concluding that Utah's direct file statute does not conflict with the remaining
sections of the Juvenile Court Act, see Utah Code Ann. § 78A-6-101 et seq., and that the direct-file
statute does not violate constitutional principles. Shortly after his arrest, Petitioner was housed in
general population at the Salt Lake County Adult Detention Complex, where he remained until April
18, 2009, when he was moved to maximum security in same the Adult Detention Complex.
DISCUSSION
Petitioner argues that his incarceration in an adult detention facility as a juvenile violates
Section 62A-7-201, the Utah Administrative Code, the Utah Constitution, and the United States
Constitution. He seeks extraordinary relief and an immediate temporary order under rale 65B(b) of
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure for his release from the Adult Detention Complex and for
placement in juvenile detention consistent with Section 62A-7-201, pending resolution in the
criminal action.
I.

Utah Code Sections 78A-6-701 and 62A-7-201
Petitioner argues that Section 62A-7-201(l) prohibits minors who are charged under the

direct-file statute from being confined in an adult detention facility.
Children under 18 years of age, who are apprehended by any officer or brought
before any court for examination under any provision of state law, may not be
confined in jails, lockups, or cells used for persons 18 years of age or older who are
charged with crime, or in secure postadjudication correctional facilities operated by
the division, except as provided by specific statute and in conformance with
standards approved by the board.
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Utah Code Ann. § 62A-7-201(l) (2008).

Section 62A-7-201(2) provides an exception for

"[cjhildren charged by information or indictment with crimes as a serious youth offender under
Section 78A-6-702 or certified to stand trial as an adult pursuant to Section 78A-6-703" and
mandates their detention in a jail or in another adult detention facility. Utah Code Ann. § 62A-7201(2)(a); see also Utah Code Ann. §§ 78A-6-702 and -703 (2008).1 However, minors awaiting a
hearing under the Serious Youth Offender Act ("SYOA") or certification statute who are detained
in an adult detention facility must be in "certified juvenile detention accommodations in accordance
with rules promulgated by the [Djivision [of Juvenile Justice Services]." Utah Code Ann. § 62A-7201 (2)(b). Petitioner contends that his detention in an adult facility not only violates Section 62A-7201, but that in confining him there, the State has committed a class B misdemeanor. See Utah Code
Ann. §62A-7-201(5).
In support of his argument, Petitioner contends that the plain language of Section 62A-7-201
evidences the Legislature's intent for minors charged under the direct-file statute to remain in
juvenile detention under the auspices of the Division of Juvenile Justice Services ("DJJS"). See
Utah Code Ann. §§ 62A-7-101 et seq. He argues that the Legislature intentionally chose not to
create an exception for minors charged under the direct-file statute to be detained in adult facilities
as it did for minors charged under the SYOA or the certification statute.
However, if the court interpreted Section 62A-7-201 by the plain language as Petitioner

The SYOA requnes that a youth 16 yeais or older must be charged by criminal Information for one of several
enumerated felonies, excluding muider or aggravated murder If the juvenile court finds probable cause and certain
mitigating factors are absent, it must order the youth to be bound over m district court. See Utah Code Ann. § 78A-6702. The certification statute provides that the prosecutor may file a criminal Information and move the juvenile court
to certify to the district court a youth 14 years or older charged with a felony If the juvenile court finds probable cause,
it must conduct a preliminary hearing to determine whether it would be "contrary to the best interests of the minor or the
public foi the juvenile court to retain jurisdiction " Id. § 78A-6-703.
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urges, it would conflict with the direct-file statute, thereby rendering the direct-file statute
nonsensical. Although there are inconsistencies between the direct-file statute and Section 62A-7201, "the court cannot presume that the legislature intended to create conflict." Madsen v. Brown,
701 P.2d 1086, 1089-90 (Utah 1985). In fact, "it is axiomatic that a statute should be given a
reasonable and sensible construction and that the legislature did not intend an absurd or unreasonable
result." Bd. of Educ. of Jordan Sch. Dist. v. Sandy City Corp., 94 P.3d 234, 237 (Utah 2004)
(internal quotation marks omitted). Instead, "statutes must be looked at together, in the light of
established rules o f statutory construction, with a view to reconciling any apparent conflict and
giving each of them effect according to their purpose insofar as that can be accomplished." United
States Smelting, Ref & Mining Co. v. Nielsen, 437 P.2d 199, 201 (Utah 1968) (Crockett, C.J.,
concurring).
If the court failed to harmonize the statutes, then, in effect, minors charged with serious youth
offenses or certified to district court as adults would have to be detained in an adult facility, but a
minor 16 years and older charged with the even more serious offense of murder would have to be
detained in a juvenile facility. The intent of the Legislature in expressly excepting minors charged
under Sections 78A-6-702 and -703 from placement in a juvenile facility was to ensure placement
of minors charged with the most serious offenses in an adult detention facility. Accordingly, it is
only logical that the Legislature also wanted the court to hold minors 16 years and older charged with
murder in an adult detention facility. Moreover, the Legislature likely did not consider the direct-file
statute to be in conflict. Because the direct-file statute confers original exclusive jurisdiction of the
district court over minors 16 years and older who have been charged with murder, it would be
redundant to add Section 78A-6-701 to the exceptions in Section 62A-7-201(2)(b).
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In addition, the legislative history of the direct-file statute demonstrates the Legislature's
intent to detain persons 16 years and older charged with murder in adult facilities that were exempt
from DJJS standards. In Mohi, the Utah Supreme Court held unconstitutional Section 78-3a-25
because it permitted prosecutors "undirected discretion" in filing charges against minors accused of
the same serious offenses either as adults in district court or as juveniles in juvenile court. See State
v. MohU 901 P.2d 991, 998-1004 (Utah 1995); Utah Code Ann. § 78-3a-25 (1994) (created two
classes of similar situated minors accused of capital or first murder depending on which court the
charges were filed). The Supreme Court was clear that its concern was not trying juveniles as adults
in district court, but rather the nonuniform application of which juveniles were tried as adults. See
MohU 901 P.2d at 998-1004.
In 1996, after Mohi, the Legislature divested prosecutors of this discretion and enacted the
direct-file provision as a stand-alone statute. From that point on, charges brought against minors 16
years or older for murder had to be brought in district court. See Utah Code Ann. § 78A-6-701
(2008). In contrast, charges against minors under the SYOA or certification statute are initially
brought in juvenile court and remain under the jurisdiction of the juvenile court until bound over or
certified to district court. See Utah Code Ann. §§ 78A-6-702, -703 (2008). Because minors charged
under the direct-file statute are automatically under district court jurisdiction, it was not necessary
for the Legislature to include the direct-file statute as an exception in Section 62 A-7-201 and Section
78A-6-113(11).
Nonetheless, the Supreme Court and the Legislature clearly intended for certain minors to
be charged as adults. As soon as minors are bound over or certified to district court under the SYOA
or certification statute they are treated as adults and must be detained in an adult facility. See Utah
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Code Ann. §§ 62A-7-201(2)(a); 78A-6-113(11); 78A-6-702(3)(b), (10), -703(7), and (13). Once
subject to district court jurisdiction under the direct-file statute, the SYOA, or the certification
statute, minors continue to be subject to district court jurisdiction unless they are acquitted, found
not guilty, or otherwise have all of their charges dismissed. See Utah Code Ann. §§ 78A-6701(3)(b), -702(11), and -703(14). See also State v. Housekeeper, 2002 UT 118, f22, 62 P.3d 444.
Mohi is also instructive to Petitioner's argument concerning the language in Section 62A-7201. The Court considered a similarly-worded statute, Section 78-3a-30(9), which provided that "[a]
child held for criminal proceedings under Section 78-3a-25 may be detained in a jail or other place
of detention used for adults charged with crime."2 Utah Code Ann. § 78-3a-30(9) (1994) (emphasis
added). The Mohi Court explained that the "may" in the statute now numbered as Section 78A-6113(11)3 means the court has the option to order a minor charged under the SYOA or certification
statute either in a jail "or another adult detention center," Mohi, 901 P.2d at 1006 (emphasis added).
It does not mean that the court has the option to order that minor to a juvenile detention center. See
id. The same "may" is applicable to Section 62A-7-201(2)(a): "Children charged by information
or indictment with crimes as a serious youth offender under Section 78A-6-702 or certified to stand
trial as an adult pursuant to Section 78A-6-703 may be detained in a jail or other place of detention
used for adults." The "may" is not discretionary as to whether they are detained in an adult or a
juvenile facility, but rather as to the type of adult facility. Since publication of Mohi in 1995, the
Legislature consciously chose not to change the language in Section 78A-6-113(11) and Section
2

Section78-3a-30(9) was renumbered 78-3a-509, then as78-3a-l 14(11), and currently as 78A-6-113(11) (2008)
("A minor held for criminal proceedings under Section 78A-6-702 or 78A-6-703 may be detained in a jail or other place
of detention used for adults charged with crime.).
Petitioner does not take issue with Section 78A-6-113(11), which is nearly identical to Section 62A-7201(2)(a).
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62A-7-201(2)(a).
In light of the foregoing analysis, district courts do not have discretion to transfer to juvenile
court a minor 16 years or older charged under the direct-file statute and, therefore, this court does
not have the discretion to transfer this proceeding to juvenile court or to transfer Petitioner to a
juvenile detention facility under Section 62A-7-201.
II.

Division of Juvenile Justice Services
Petitioner next argues that the Salt Lake County Jail does not comply with the standards

necessary to safely and humanely house minors as required by Utah law. See Utah Code Ann. § 761-104(4) (stating that one of the principles of the Criminal Code is to "[p]revent arbitrary or
oppressive treatment of persons accused or convicted of offenses"); Utah Code Ann. § 62A-7-201
(Division of Juvenile Justice Services standards for detention of minors); and Utah Admin Code. r.
547-3-1 through -3 and r. 547-7-1 through -3 (providing that minors must be separated from adults
by sight and sound and that minors require continuous supervision through audio or visual
monitoring).
Petitioner was charged in district court as an adult under Section 78A-6-701 and is therefore
not treated as a juvenile under the Juvenile Court Act or under the juvenile statutes in the Utah
Human Services Code or the Department of Human Services section of the Utah Administration
Code. See Utah Code Ann. § 78A-6-701(l) ("The district court shall have exclusive original
jurisdiction over all persons 16 years of age or older charged by information or indictment with an
offense which would be murder or aggravated murder if committed by an adult"). See also Utah
Code Aim. §78A-6-103 (conferring juvenile court jurisdiction only over those minors who are not
otherwise subject to the jurisdiction of the district court provided in Sections 78A-6-701, -702, or
7

-703). As such, the court does not have discretion to transfer this matter to the juvenile court under
any circumstances.
Similarly, the DJJS does not have jurisdiction over minors charged as adults. See Utah Code
Ann. § 62A-7-101 et seq. DJJS standards or those promulgated under the Department of Human
Services section of the Utah Administration Code do not apply to adult detention facilities, even
when they house minors who are subject to district court jurisdiction, whether under the direct-file
statute, the SYOA, or the certification statute. Rather, Section 62A-7-102 confers DJJS jurisdiction
only "over all youth committed to it pursuant to Section 78A-6-117." Utah Code Ann. § 62A-7-102.
See also Utah Code Ann. § 78A-6-117 (court must adjudicate when a minor falls under the
jurisdiction of the juvenile court according to Section 78A-6-113(1)). Under Sections 62A-7-201(l),
(2)(a), and (6)(b), DJJS standards are applicable to minors detained in adult facilities only when they
are awaiting a hearing under Sections 78A-6-702 and -703, when they are in low-population density
areas, and when they are held a maximum of two hours. Specifically excluded from the DJJS
standards are minors charged as adults under 78A-6-701, -702, or -703.
III.

Constitutional Principles
Petitioner airgues that his detention in an adult facility violates his rights to due process, the

uniform operation of the laws, and equal protection. See U.S. Const, amend. XIV; Utah Const, art.
I, §§ 7, 12, and 24. Petitioner has not been denied due process under the Fourteenth Amendment of
the United States Constitution. As a person 16 year old, Petitioner is not entitled to be tried as
juvenile. See Mohi, 901 P.2d at 1005 ("Juveniles have no constitutional right to be tried as
juveniles."). In fact, minors charged in district court under the direct-file statute, as with those
subject to district court jurisdiction under SYOA or the certification statute, do not have a
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constitutional right to be tried in juvenile court or according to DJJS standards. "[T]he state is not
required to give juvenile status to anyone.. .. Because they have no 'right' to juvenile treatment,
defendants cannot claim that their juvenile status was unconstitutionally removed by the legislature."
Id.
Petitioner challenges the constitutionality of his detention under both the uniform operation
of laws provision of the Utah Constitution, see Utah Const. Art I, § 24, and under the equal
protection of laws provision of the United States Constitution. See U.S. Const. Amend. XIV, § 1.
The direct-file statute does not violate either. As a 16 year old charged with murder, Petitioner is
not a member of a suspect class and as such, "statutes that create classifications based on age are
analyzed under a rational basis review." Merrill v. Utah Labor Comm % 2009 UT 26, f 8,628 Utah
Adv. Rep. 22. The Supreme Court in Mohi clarified that courts must scrutinize the constitutionality
of statutes under article I, section 24 on the basis of "whether the classification is reasonable,
whether the objectives of the legislative action are legitimate, and whether there is a reasonable
relationship between the classification and the legislative purposes." Mohi, 901 P.2d at 996 (internal
citations omitted). See also Merrill, 2009 UT 26 at 1J9.
The classification of minors as adults is reasonable under the direct-file statute, the SYOA
if bound over, and the certification statute if certified to district court. As stated previously, in Mohi
the Supreme Court held that Section 78-2a-25 permitted prosecutors unfettered discretion to charge
minors who committed the same crime in different courts. See id. at 1003. Subsequently, the
Legislature amended the statutes to create a stand-alone direct-file statute removing this discretion
from prosecutors and directing them to charge minors 16 and older with murder only in district court.
Now, prosecutors make a charging decision based on the elements of the offense, rather than making
9

an unfettered choice of court. See id. The Mohi court did not hold that juveniles should never be
treated as adults, but rather that prosecutors need to be directed as to "which violent juveniles"
should be treated as adults since "there is a legitimate need to try certain violent juveniles as adults."
Id.
The statutes serve the legitimate need of community safety as well as safety for minors
housed in juvenile detention. The Legislature has a legitimate need to "promote public safety and
individual accountability by the imposition of appropriate sanctions on persons who have committed
acts in violation of law." Utah Code Ann. § 78A-6-102(5)(a) (2008). There is a reasonable
relationship between this obj ective and detaining certain minors as adults in adult detention facilities.
Adult detention facilities are better equipped to provide a secure place for holding minors charged
with violent and serious offenses under the direct-file statute, the SYOA, or the certification statute.
It removes these minors from juvenile detention and thereby creates a safer place for younger minors
charged with less serious offenses.
IV.

Unnecessary Rigor
Petitioner also contends that holding him in adult jail violates his state constitutional right

against unnecessary rigorous treatment. See Utah Const, art. I, § 9 ("Persons arrested or imprisoned
shall not be treated with unnecessary rigor"). "Unnecessary rigor" is "treatment which is clearly
excessive or deficient and unjustified." Bott v. DeLand, 922 P.2d 732,741 (Utah 1996). It has more
recently been described as "unreasonably harsh, strict, or severe treatment" and as '"treatment that
is clearly excessive or deficient and unjustified, [and] not merely the frustrations, inconveniences,
and irritations that are common to prison life." Dexter v. Bosko, 2008 UT 29, fl9, 184 P.3d 592
(quoting Bott, 922 P.2d at 741).
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For its inquiry into whether Petitioner has been treated with unnecessary rigor, the court
reviews the specific facts as applied to Petitioner's detention in the Adult Detention Complex.
Accordingly, the court enters the following findings of fact based on affidavits submitted by
Petitioner and by Rollin Cook, the Corrections Bureau Chief with the Salt Lake County Sheriffs
Office.
1. Petitioner was born November 27,1992; he is currently 16 years old. See Aff. of Ricky
Angilau at %2.
2. Petitioner was initially held in the general population at the Salt Lake City Adult
Detection Complex. He was moved to maximum security on April 18, 2009 and is currently still
there. See id. at Iff 3-5.
3. Since being housed in maximum security, Petitioner has had fewer opportunities to
socialize, make calls, receive educational packets to complete his GED, and to participate in mental
health and other classes. See id. at ff 15-18.
4. Minors housed at the Adult Detention Complex, whether as serious youth offenders,
certified to stand trial as adults, or as direct-file juveniles, are all treated the same. See Aff. of Rollin
Cook at f 26.
5.

Prisoners in the general population have eight hours per day out of their cells and

prisoners in maximum security have one hour per day out of their cells. See id.. While out of their
cells, prisoners may shower, make phone calls, exercise, and socialize. See Aff. of Ricky Angilau
at 1|15.
6. Petitioner "is being clothed, fed, sheltered, and is provided with constitutionally required
medical care should he need it." Aff. of Rollin Cook at f31.
11

7. In maximum security, Petitioner does not have access to mental health programs.
However, upon request mental health treatment would be made available to Petitioner. See id. |34.
8. Petitioner "has not reported any physical, emotional, or physiological attacks by other
prisoners or jail staff, nor [is Mr. Cook] aware of such attacks." Id. at f36.
9. The Adult Detention Complex maximum security units have two officers during day and
afternoon shifts and it is monitored by an officer working from a tower tasked with monitoring two
maximum security units. See id. at ^[fl 1-12.
10. "[Petitioner] has some opportunities for education, family visits, recreation, and
clergy/religious visits," id. at f 32, but these may be limited in the event of safety and security
emergencies. See id. at ffi[32-25.
11. Additionally, the maximum security units are monitored by officers in the tower and by
central control employees who monitor two cameras placed within the units. See id. at ^[13.
12. Overnight, one guard monitors two maximum security units. See id. at f 15.
13. In the maximum security units, prisoners are automatically reassessed for a possible
change in the classification every 90 days. See id. at ^24.
In its inquiry, the court considers these findings, including Petitioner's age. What a 16 year
old experiences as "harsh, strict, or severe treatment" might be quite different from what a person
of a different age might experience. A16 year old may not be as physically, emotionally, or mentally
mature as an older prisoner. Likewise, 16 year olds would likely have substantially differing levels
of maturity and development from one another.
An age-specific analysis is appropriate under the unnecessary rigor clause. However, it is
also true that a person's age, without other support, does not change the meaning of unnecessary
12

rigor. The court concludes, therefore, that Petitioner has not met his burden of demonstrating that
he is being treated with unnecessary rigor. The mere fact that Petitioner is detained in an adult
detention facility, even in maximum detention with adults twice his age who may be more mature
and more developed physically and mentally, and in frequent solitude without the same opportunities
for mental health classes, education, recreation, and socialization does not necessarily translate into
treatment that meets the definition of unnecessary rigor. In this matter, Petitioner's treatment, even
as a 16 year old, is not unreasonably harsh or unjustified.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing analysis, Petitioner is properly held in the Adult Detention Complex.
The direct-file statute does not conflict with Section 62A-7-201. The district court does not have
discretion to transfer these proceedings to juvenile court, nor can it order the transfer of Petitioner
to juvenile detention. The Adult Detention Complex is not subject to the standards of the DJJS.
Petitioner's detention in an adult facility does not violate any provisions of the Utah Constitution or
the United States Constitution. Finally, after a fact-specific inquiry of Petitioner's claim under the
unnecessary rigor clause, the court finds that his treatment is not so harsh or severe as to be deemed
unconstitutional.
ORDER
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Petitioner's Petition for Extraordinary Relief and Request
for Immediate Temporary Relief is denied.
This Memorandum Decision and Order constitutes the final order of the Court. No further
order is necessary to effectuate the Court's decision.
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day of August, 2009.
BY THE COURT:
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CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, RULES AND REGULATIONS

Constitution of Utah, Article I § 7
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, without due process of law.
Constitution of Utah, Article I § 9

Excessive bail shall not be required; excessive fines shall not be imposed; nor
shall cruel and unusual punishments be inflicted. Persons arrested or imprisoned shall not
be treated with unnecessary rigor.
Constitution of Utah, Article I § 24
All laws of a general nature shall have uniform operation.
Constitution of Utah, Article I §27
Frequent recurrence to fundamental principles is essential to the security of
individual rights and the perpetuity of free government.
Constitution of Utah, Article V § 1
The powers of the government of the State of Utah shall be divided into three
distinct departments, the Legislative, the Executive, and the Judicial; and no person
charged with the exercise of powers properly belonging to one of these departments, shall
exercise any fund ions appertaining to either of the others, except in the cases herein
expressly directed or permitted.
Constitution of Utah, Article VI § 1
(1) The Legislative power of the State shall be vested in:
(a) a Senate and House of Representatives which shall be designated the Legislature of
the State of Utah; and
(b) the people of the State of Utah as provided in Subsection (2).
(2)(a)(i) The legal voters of the State of Utah, in the numbers, under the conditions, in the
manner, and within the time provided by statute, may:
(A) initiate any desired legislation and cause it to be submitted to the people for
adoption upon a majority vote of those voting on the legislation, as provided by
statute; or
(B) require any law passed by the Legislature, except those laws passed by a
two-thirds vote of the members elected to each house of the Legislature, to be

submitted to the voters of the State, as provided by statute, before the law may take
effect,
(ii) Notwithstanding Subsection (2)(a)(i)(A), legislation initiated to allow, limit, or
prohibit the taking of wildlife or the season for or method of taking wildlife shall be
adopted upon approval of two-thirds of those voting.
(b) The legal voters of any county, city, or town, in the numbers, under the conditions,
in the manner, and within the time provided by statute, may:
(i) initiate any desired legislation and cause it to be submitted to the people of the
county, city, or town for adoption upon a majority vote of those voting on the
legislation, as provided by statute; or
(ii) require any law or ordinance passed by the law making body of the county, city, or
town to be submitted to the voters thereof, as provided by statute, before the law or
ordinance may take effect.

Constitution of Utah, Article VI § 6
No private or special law shall be enacted where a general law can be applicable.

United States Constitution, Amendment XIV, § 1
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction
thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside. No State
shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens
of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws.

Utah Administrative Code R547-3
R547-3-1. Authority.

Section 62A-1-111 authorizes the Department of Human Services to adopt administrative
rules.
R547-3-2. Definitions and References.

(1) Definitions.

(a) "Low density population" means ten or less people per square mile.
(b) "Nonoffenders" means abused, neglected, or dependent youth.
(c) "Sight and sound separation" means that juvenile detainees must be located or arranged
as to be completely separated from incarcerated adults by sight and sound barriers such
that the adult inmates cannot see juvenile detainees and vice versa. Also, conversation is
not possible between juvenile detainees and adult inmates.
(d) "Status offense" means a violation of the law that would not be a violation but for the
age of the offender.
(2) References.
(a) Standards from the Manual of Standards for Juvenile Detention Facilities and
Services, also referred to as American Correctional Association (ACA) Standards,
revision date of February 1979, were researched as background for the rules.
R547-3-3. Standards for Six Hour Juvenile Detention in Jail.
(1) Juveniles under the age of 18 shall not be confined in a county operated jail used for
accused or convicted adult offenders except:
(a) when the juvenile is 16 years of age or older and district court has exclusive original
jurisdiction, Section 78A-6-701;
(b) when the juvenile is 16 years of age or older and has been bound over to district court
for criminal proceedings, in accordance with serious youth offender procedures,
Subsection 78A-6-702(3);
(c) when the juvenile is 14 years of age or older and has been certified to be held for criminal
proceedings in district court, Section 78A-6-703 and Subsection 78A-6-602(3);
(d) in areas characterized by low density population. The state Juvenile Justice Services
agency may promulgate regulations providing for specific approved juvenile holding
accommodations within adult facilities which have acceptable sight and sound separation
to be utilized for short-term holding purposes with a maximum confinement of six hours
to allow adequate time for identification or interrogation and to evaluate needs and
circumstances regarding transportation, detention, or release of the juvenile in custody,
Section 62A-7-201.
(2) The Division of Juvenile Justice Services may certify a jail to hold juveniles who are
alleged to have committed a non-status offense or are accused of juvenile handgun
possession for up to six hours if the following criteria are met:
(a) in areas characterized by low density population;
(b) no existing acceptable alternative placement exists which will protect the juvenile and
the community;
(c) the county is not served by a local juvenile detention facility;
(d) no juvenile under ten years of age will be held by holding authorities, as set forth in
the following standards, for any length of time.
(3) Any jail or adult holding facility intended for use for juveniles must be certified by the
State Division of Juvenile Justice Services.
(4) There shall be acceptable sight and sound separation from adult inmates. Written policy
and procedure shall exist to assure supervision is maintained so that both visual contact and

verbal communication between juvenile detainees and adult inmates is prohibited.
(5) The jail's juvenile detention room(s) shall conform to all applicable zoning laws.
(6) The jail's juvenile detention room(s) shall conform to all applicable local and state safety,
fire, and building codes.
(7) The jail's juvenile detention room(s) shall conform to all applicable local and state health
codes.
(8) The juvenile population shall not exceed the jail's certified capacity for juveniles.
(9) All juvenile housing and activity areas provide for, at a minimum:
(a) toilet and wash basin accessibility;
(b) hot and cold running water in wash basin and drinking water;
(c) adequate shelter, heat, light, and ventilation that does not compromise security or enable
escape;
(10) Whenever juveniles are detained, there shall be at a minimum:
(a) Removal of all property from the juvenile that could compromise the juvenile's safety,
such as belts, shoelaces and suspenders, prior to placing a juvenile in a holding room;
(b) constant on-site supervision through visual or TV monitoring and audio two way
communication;
(c) frequent personal checks to maintain communication with the juvenile and prevent panic
and feelings of isolation;
(d) a written record of significant incidents and activities of the juvenile.
(11) The written policies and procedures providing for specific rules governing the
supervision of inmates by jail staff of the opposite sex shall specifically provide for the
following when the inmates are juveniles:
(a) An adult staff member of the same sex as the juvenile shall be present when a juvenile
is securely held.
(b) Except in an emergency the staff member entering a juvenile's sleeping room shall be
of the same sex. If there are two staff members entering the sleeping room, there may be
one male and one female. When an emergency prevents the same sex staff member from
entering the juvenile's room, then at least two opposite sex staff members must be present
and a written report must be completed and kept on file justifying the necessity for the
deviation from same sex supervision.
(c) When procedures require physical contact or examination, such as strip searches, these
shall be done by a staff member of the same sex in private without TV monitoring.
Procedures for body cavity searches shall conform to jail standards.
(d) A staff member of the same sex shall supervise the personal hygiene activities and care
such as showers, toilet, and related activities.
(e) The use of restraints or physical force are restricted to instances of justifiable
self-defense, protection ofjuveniles and others, protection of property and prevention of
escapes, and only when it is necessary to control juveniles and in accordance with the
principle of least restrictive action. In no event is physical force justifiable as punishment.
A written report is prepared following all uses of force and is submitted to the facility
administrator.

(12) Male and female residents shall not occupy the same sleeping room at the same time.
(13) There shall be no viewing devices, such as peep holes, mirrors, of which the juvenile
is not aware.
(14) No inmate, juvenile or adult, shall be allowed to have authority or disciplinary control
over, be permitted to supervise, or provide direct services of any nature to other detained
juveniles.
(15) The juvenile's health and safety while jailed shall be safeguarded. The jail administration
shall:
(a) have services available to provide 24 hours a day emergency medical care;
(b) provide for immediate examination and treatment, if necessary, of juveniles injured
on the jail premises;
(c) not accept juveniles who are unconscious, obviously seriously injured, obviously a
suicide risk, obviously emotionally disturbed, or obviously under the influence of alcohol
or drugs and are unable to care for themselves, until they have been examined by a
qualified medical practitioner or have been taken to a medical facility for appropriate
diagnosis and treatment and released back to the jail;
(d) train all jail staff members to recognize symptoms of mental illness;
(e) provide for the detoxification of a juvenile in the jail only when there is no community
health facility to transfer the juvenile to for detoxification;
(f) require that any medical services provided while the juvenile is held be recorded.
(16) As long as classification standards are met, juvenile detainees may be housed together
if age, compatibility, dangerousness, and other relevant factors are considered.
(17) Adult jails that are certified to hold juveniles for up to six hours must have written
procedures which govern the acceptance of such juveniles. These procedures must include
the following:
(a) When an officer or other person takes a juvenile into custody, the officer shall without
unnecessary delay notify the parents, guardian, or custodian.
(b) The jail staff shall verify with the officer or other person taking the juvenile into custody
that the juvenile's parents, guardian, or custodian have been notified of the juvenile's
detention in jail. If notification did not occur, jail staff will contact the juvenile's parents,
guardian, or custodian.
(c) The officer shall also promptly file with the detention or shelter facility a brief written
report stating the facts which appear to bring the juvenile within the jurisdiction of the
Juvenile Court and give the reason why the juvenile was not released.
(18) There must be written policy and procedures that require that the decision to detain the
juvenile for up to six hours or to release the juvenile from jail be in accordance with the
following principles:
(a) A juvenile shall not be detained by policy any longer than is reasonably necessary to
obtain the juvenile's name, age, residence, and any other necessary information, and to
contact the juvenile's parents, guardian, or custodian.
(b) The juvenile shall then be released to the care of the parent or other responsible adult
unless the immediate welfare or the protection of the community requires that the juvenile

be detained or that it is unsafe for the juvenile or the public to leave the juvenile in the
care of the parents, guardian, or custodian. On release from jail, the parent or other person
to whom the juvenile is released may be required to sign a written promise on forms
supplied by the court to bring the juvenile to court at a time set, or to be set, by the court,
Subsection 78A-6-112(3).
(19) The written procedures for admitting juvenile detainees will include completion of an
admission form on all juveniles that includes, as a minimum, the following information:
(a) date and time of admission and release;
(b) name, nicknames, and aliases;
(c) last known address;
(d) law enforcement jurisdiction, name, and title, of delivering officer;
(e) specific charge(s);
(f) sex;
(g) date of birth and place of birth;
(h) race or nationality;
(i) medical problems, if any;
(j) parents, guardian, or responsible person to notify in case of emergency, including
addresses and telephone numbers;
(k) space for remarks, to include notation of any open wounds or sores requiring treatment,
evidence of disease or body vermin, or tattoos;
(1) probation officer or caseworker assigned, if any;
(20) Juvenile processing procedures shall include written safeguards to prohibit nonoffenders
from being detained in the facility and to ensure youth are held in accordance with R547-3-3.
(21) There must be a written procedure governing the transfer of a juvenile to an appropriate
juvenile facility which includes the following:
(a) If the juvenile is to be transferred to a juvenile facility, the juvenile must be
transported there without unnecessary delay, but in no case more than six hours after
being taken into custody. A copy of the report stating the facts which appear to bring the
juvenile within the jurisdiction of the court and giving the reason for not releasing the
juvenile shall be transmitted with the juvenile when transported.
(b) A written record shall be retained on file of all juveniles released, stating as a minimum
to whom they were released, the release date, time, and authority.
(c) Procedures for releasing juvenile detainees shall include at a minimum:
(i) verification of identity;
(ii) verification of release papers;
(iii) completion of release arrangements;
(iv) return of juvenile detainee's personal effects and funds;
(v) verification that no jail property or other resident property leaves the jail with the
juvenile.
(22) The written procedures governing the stay of a juvenile shall include:
(a) A juvenile, while held in a certified jail, shall have the same legal and civil rights as
an adult inmate.

(b) A juvenile, while held in a certified jail, shall have the right to the same number of
telephone calls as an adult inmate held the same amount of time.
(c) Unless the juvenile is to be transferred to an approved detention facility, visits should
be limited to the juvenile's attorney, clergyman, and officers of the court. If the juvenile
is to be transferred, an effort shall be made to provide for visitation by the juvenile's
parents, guardian, or custodian prior to the transfer.
(d) If a juvenile is held during daylight hours the juvenile should be allowed access to
reading materials. Where feasible the juvenile should be provided access to physical
exercise and recreation, such as radio and TV.
(23) A case record shall be maintained on each juvenile admitted to a certified jail. Policies
and procedures concerning the case records and the information in them shall be established
which meet the following as a minimum:
(a) The contents of case records shall be identified and separated according to an
established format.
(b) Case records shall be safeguarded from unauthorized and improper disclosure, in
accordance with written policies and in compliance with Section 78A-6-209 and Section
78A-6-1104.
(c) The facility shall assure that no information shall be entered into a case record that is
incomplete, inaccurate, or unsubstantiated. At any point that it becomes apparent that this
has occurred, the facility shall immediately make the necessary correction.
(24) A case record shall be maintained on each juvenile, as appropriate, and kept in a secure
place. It shall contain as a minimum the following information and documents:
(a) initial intake information form;
(b) documented legal authority to accept, detain, and release juveniles;
(c) current detention medical/health care record;
(d) consent for necessary medical or surgical care, signed by parent, person acting in loco
parentis, Juvenile Court judge, or facility official;
(e) record of medication administered;
(f) record of incident reports;
(g) a record of cash and valuables held;
(h) visitors' names, if any, personal and professional, and dates of visits;
(i) final discharge or transfer report.
(25) The jail facility director shall submit to the state Division of Juvenile Justice Services
agency a monthly accurate report of the numbers of juveniles confined during the preceding
month and provide information on each juvenile in the categories indicated on the report
form as provided by the State.

Utah Administrative Code R547-7

R547-7-1. Authority.
Section 62A-1-111 authorizes the Department of Human Services to adopt administrative
rules.
R547-7-2. Definitions.
(1) "Nonoffenders" means abused, neglected, or dependent youth.
(2) "Sight and sound separation" means that juvenile detainees must be located or arranged
as to be completely separated from incarcerated adults by sight and sound barriers such that
the adult inmates cannot see juvenile detainees and vice versa. Also, conversation is not
possible between juvenile detainees and adult inmates.
(3) "Status offense" means a violation of the law that would not be a violation but for the age
of the offender.
R547-7-3. Standards for Two Hour Juvenile Detention in Local Law Enforcement Facilities.
(1) Criteria by which juveniles may be held:
(a) The maximum holding period will be two hours as provided for by Subsection
62A-7-201(4).
(b) Extensive efforts will be made by holding authorities during these two hours to
contact the juvenile's parents, guardian, or other responsible adult and arrange for the
juvenile's release.
(c) No juvenile under ten years of age will be held by holding authorities, as set forth in
the following standards, for any length of time.
(d) Only juveniles who are alleged to have committed a non-status offense or are accused
of juvenile handgun possession may be detained for identification or interrogation or
while awaiting release to a parent or other responsible adult.
(e) Despite the authorization to hold a juvenile in a certified holding room for up to two
hours, no juvenile shall be held in such a room unless there is no other alternative which
will protect the juvenile and the community.
(2) Any holding facility intended for use for juveniles must be certified by the state Division
of Juvenile Justice Services, Subsection 62A-7-201(4).
(3) There shall be acceptable sight and sound separation from adult inmates, as found in
Subsection 62A-7-201(4). Written policy and procedure shall exist to assure supervision is
maintained so that both visual contact and verbal communication between juvenile detainees
and adult inmates is prohibited.
(4) The juvenile holding rooms and the building in which they are located shall conform to
all applicable:
(a) zoning laws;
(b) local and state safety, fire, and building codes;
(c) local and state health codes.

(5) All two hour holding room areas provide for, at a minimum:
(a) access to a toilet and wash basin;
(b) adequate shelter, heat, light, and ventilation that does not compromise security or
enable escape;
(c) access to a drinking fountain;
(d) adequate utilitarian furnishings, including suitable chairs or benches.
(6) Whenever juveniles are detained, there shall be at a minimum:
(a) Removal of all property from the juvenile that could compromise the juvenile's safety,
such as belts, shoelaces, and suspenders, prior to placing a juvenile in a holding room;
(b) constant on-site supervision, through visual monitoring and audio two way
communication, Subsection 62A-7-201(4);
(c) a P.O.S.T. certified or qualified staff must be available to intervene within 60 seconds
should a problem or medical emergency arise with a juvenile;
(d) frequent personal checks must occur with the juvenile to maintain communication and
prevent panic and feelings of isolation;
(e) a written record of significant incidents and activities of the juvenile.
(7) A staff member of the same sex shall supervise the personal hygiene activities and care
such as toilet related activities.
(8) When procedures require physical contact or examination, such as strip searches, these
shall be done by a staff member of the same sex in private without TV monitoring. Body
cavity searches shall be performed only when there is probable cause to believe that weapons
or contraband will be found. With the exception of the mouth, all body cavity searches
performed visually will be done by two personnel of the same sex as the youth. Manually
performed body cavity searches will be performed by medically trained personnel, at least
one of which will be the same sex as the youth being examined.
(9) There shall be no viewing devices, such as peep holes or mirrors, of which the juvenile
is not aware.
(10) No detainee, juvenile or adult, shall be allowed to have authority or disciplinary control
over, be permitted to supervise, or provide services of any nature to other detained juveniles.
(11) The juvenile's health and safety while in the holding room shall be safeguarded by
following standard elements on medical and health service. In order to assure this, the
holding room administration shall:
(a) have services available to provide 24 hours a day emergency medical care;
(b) provide for immediate examination and treatment, if necessary, of juveniles injured
on the holding room premises;
(c) not accept juveniles who are unconscious, obviously seriously injured, obviously a
suicide risk, obviously emotionally disturbed, or obviously under the influence of alcohol
or drugs and are unable to care for themselves, until they have been examined by a
qualified medical practitioner or have been taken to a medical facility for appropriate
diagnosis and treatment and released back to the holding room;
(d) train all holding room staff members to recognize symptoms of mental illness;
(e) require that any medical services provided while the juvenile is held be recorded.

(12) As long as classification standards are met, juveniles may be detained together if age,
compatibility, dangerousness, and other relevant factors are considered. Juveniles of opposite
genders may not be detained together.
(13) There must be written procedures in holding rooms governing the acceptance of
juveniles, which include the following:
(a) When an officer or other person takes a juvenile into custody, they shall without
unnecessary delay notify the parents, guardian, or custodian.
(b) The holding room staff shall verify with the officer or other person taking the juvenile
into custody that the juvenile's parents, guardian, or custodian have been notified of the
juvenile's detention. If notification did not occur, agency staff will contact the juvenile's
parents, guardian, or custodian.
(14) There must be written policy and procedure that require that the decision to detain the
juvenile for up to two hours or release the juvenile be in accordance with the following
principles: Sections 78A-6-112, 78A-6-113, and 62A-7-201.
(a) A juvenile shall not be detained any longer than is reasonably necessary to obtain their
name, age, residence and any other necessary information, and to contact the juvenile's
parents, guardian, or custodian.
(b) The juvenile shall then be released to the care of the parent or other responsible adult
unless the immediate welfare or the protection of the community requires that the juvenile
be detained or that it is unsafe for the juvenile or the public to leave the juvenile in the
care of the parents, guardian or custodian. If after interrogation it is found that the
juvenile should be detained, transfer to an appropriate juvenile facility shall occur without
unnecessary delay.
(c) A release record must be maintained which includes:
(i) information regarding physical and emotional condition of juvenile;
(ii) relationship of adult assuming release responsibility to juvenile;
(iii) means of proof of adult identification;
(iv) signature of said adult assuming responsibility regarding juvenile's physical and
emotional condition and understanding of reason for holding the juvenile in custody.
(15) An admission or referral form must be completed on each juvenile detained which
includes, as a minimum, the following information:
(a) date and time of admission and release;
(b) name, nicknames, and aliases;
(c) last known address;
(d) law enforcement jurisdiction, name, and title, of delivering officer;
(e) specific charges;
(f) sex;
(g) date of birth and place of birth;
(h) race or nationality;
(i) medical problems, if any;
(j) parents, guardian, or responsible person to notify in case of emergency, including
addresses and telephone numbers;

(k) space for remarks, to include notation of any open wounds or sores requiring
treatment, evidence of disease or body vermin, or tattoos;
(1) probation officer or caseworker assigned, if any.

(16) The written procedures governing the stay of a juvenile shall include:
(a) A juvenile, while held in a certified holding room, shall have the same legal and civil
rights as an adult detainee.
(b) A juvenile, while held in a certified holding room, shall have the right to the same
number of telephone calls as an adult detainee held the same amount of time.
(17) A case record shall be maintained on each juvenile and shall be kept in a secure place.
It shall contain, as a minimum, the following information and documents:
(a) initial intake information form;
(b) documented legal authority to accept, detain, and release youth;
(c) record of incident reports;
(d) a record of cash and valuables held;
(e) visitors' names, if any, personal and professional, and dates of visits;
(f) final release or transfer report.
(18) The holding room facility director shall submit to the state Division of Juvenile Justice
Services a monthly accurate report of the numbers ofjuveniles confined during the preceding
month and provide information on each juvenile in the categories indicated on the report
form as provided by the state.
(19) Written policy and procedure provide that when a juvenile is in need of hospitalization,
a staff member accompanies and stays with the juvenile until admission, if permitted by
medical personnel, or until an adult family member or legal guardian arrives to remain with
the juvenile.
(20) All informed consent standards in the jurisdiction are observed and documented for
medical care. The informed consent of parent, guardian, or legal custodian applies when
required by law. When health care is rendered against the patient's will, it is ordered by a
standing magistrate or deemed an emergency as defined by Section 26-8a-601.
(21) Written policy and procedure provide that juveniles are not subjected to corporal or
unusual punishment, humiliation, or mental abuse.
(22) Written policy and procedure restrict the use of restraints or physical force to instances
of justifiable self-defense, protection of juveniles and others, protection of property and
prevention of escapes, and only when it is necessary to control juveniles and in accordance
with the principle of least restrictive action. In no event is physical force justifiable as
punishment. A written report is prepared following all uses of force and is submitted to the
facility administrator.
(23) At intake, each juvenile detained is informed of the steps in the detention process.
(24) Juvenile processing procedures shall include written safeguards to prohibit nonoffenders
from being detained in the facility and to ensure youth are held in accordance with
R547-7-3(l)(c)and(d).

Utah Code Ann. § 62A-1-111
The department may, in addition to all other authority and responsibility granted to it by
law:

(1) adopt rules, not inconsistent with law, as the department may consider necessary or
desirable for providing social services to the people of this state;

(2) establish and manage client trust accounts in the department's institutions and
community programs, at the request of the client or the client's legal guardian or
representative, or in accordance with federal law;

(3) purchase, as authorized or required by law, services that the department is responsible
to provide for legally eligible persons;

(4) conduct adjudicative proceedings for clients and providers in accordance with the
procedures of Title 63G, Chapter 4, Administrative Procedures Act;

(5) establish eligibility standards for its programs, not inconsistent with state or federal
law or regulations;

(6) take necessary steps, including legal action, to recover money or the monetary value
of services provided to a recipient who was not eligible;

(7) set and collect fees for its services;

(8) license agencies, facilities, and programs, except as otherwise allowed, prohibited, or
limited by law;

(9) acquire, manage, and dispose of any real or personal property needed or owned by the
department, not inconsistent with state law;

(10) receive gifts, grants, devises, and donations; gifts, grants, devises, donations, or the
proceeds thereof, may be credited to the program designated by the donor, and may be
used for the purposes requested by the donor, as long as the request conforms to state and
federal policy; all donated funds shall be considered private, nonlapsing funds and may be
invested under guidelines established by the state treasurer;

(11) accept and employ volunteer labor or services; the department is authorized to
reimburse volunteers for necessary expenses, when the department considers that
reimbursement to be appropriate;

(12) carry out the responsibility assigned in the Workforce Services Plan by the State
Council on Workforce Services;

(13) carry out the responsibility assigned by Section 9-4-802 with respect to coordination
of services for the homeless;

(14) carry out the responsibility assigned by Section 62A-5a-105 with respect to
coordination of services for students with a disability;

(15) provide training and educational opportunities for its staff;

(16) collect child support payments and any other monies due to the department;

(17) apply the provisions of Title 78B, Chapter 12, Utah Child Support Act, to parents
whose child lives out of the home in a department licensed or certified setting;

(18) establish policy and procedures in cases where the department is given custody of a
minor by the juvenile court pursuant to Section 78A-6-117; any policy and procedures
shall include:

(a) designation of interagency teams for each juvenile court district in the state;

(b) delineation of assessment criteria and procedures;

(c) minimum requirements, and timeframes, for the development and implementation of
a collaborative service plan for each minor placed in department custody; and

(d) provisions for submittal of the plan and periodic progress reports to the court;

(19) carry out the responsibilities assigned to it by statute;

(20) examine and audit the expenditures of any public funds provided to local substance
abuse authorities, local mental health authorities, local area agencies on aging, and any
person, agency, or organization that contracts with or receives funds from those
authorities or agencies. Those local authorities, area agencies, and any person or entity
that contracts with or receives funds from those authorities or area agencies, shall provide
the department with any information the department considers necessary. The department
is further authorized to issue directives resulting from any examination or audit to local
authorities, area agencies, and persons or entities that contract with or receive funds from
those authorities with regard to any public funds. If the department determines that it is
necessary to withhold funds from a local mental health authority or local substance abuse
authority based on failure to comply with state or federal law, policy, or contract
provisions, it may take steps necessary to ensure continuity of services. For purposes of
this Subsection (20) "public funds" means the same as that term is defined in Section
62A-15-102; and

£1) pursuant to Subsection 62A-2-106(l)(d), accredit one or more agencies and persons
to provide intercountry adoption services.

Utah Code Ann. § 62A-7-104

(1) The division is responsible for all youth offenders committed to it by juvenile courts
for secure confinement or supervision and treatment in the community.

(2) The division shall:

(a) establish and administer a continuum of community, secure, and nonsecure programs
for all youth offenders committed to the division;

(b) establish and maintain all detention and secure facilities and set minimum standards
for those facilities;

(c) establish and operate prevention and early intervention youth services programs for
nonadjudicated youth placed with the division; and

(d) establish observation and assessment programs necessary to serve youth offenders
committed by the juvenile court for short-term observation under Subsection
78A-6-117(2)(e), and whenever possible, conduct the programs in settings separate and
distinct from secure facilities for youth offenders.

(3) The division shall place youth offenders committed to it in the most appropriate
program for supervision and treatment.

(4) In any order committing a youth offender to the division, the juvenile court shall
specify whether the youth offender is being committed for secure confinement or
placement in a community-based program. The division shall place the youth offender in
the most appropriate program within the category specified by the court.

(5) The division shall employ staff necessary to:

(a) supervise and control youth offenders in secure facilities or in the community;

(b) supervise and coordinate treatment of youth offenders committed to the division for
placement in community-based programs; and

(c) control and supervise nonadjudicated youth placed with the division for temporary

services in receiving centers, youth services, and other programs established by the
division.

(6) Youth in the custody or temporary custody of the division are controlled or detained in
a manner consistent with public safety and rules promulgated by the division. In the event
of an unauthorized leave from a secure facility, detention center, community-based
program, receiving center, home, or any other designated placement, division employees
have the authority and duty to locate and apprehend the youth, or to initiate action with
local law enforcement agencies for assistance.

(7) The division shall establish and operate compensatory-service work programs for
youth offenders committed to the division by the juvenile court. The
compensatory-service work program shall:

(a) provide labor to help in the operation, repair, and maintenance of public facilities,
parks, highways, and other programs designated by the division;

(b) provide educational and prevocational programs in cooperation with the State Board
of Education for youth offenders placed in the program; and

(c) provide counseling to youth offenders.

(8) The division shall establish minimum standards for the operation of all private
residential and nonresidential rehabilitation facilities which provide services to juveniles
who have committed a delinquent act, in this state or in any other state.

(9) In accordance with policies established by the board, the division shall provide regular
training for staff of secure facilities, detention staff, case management staff, and staff of
the community-based programs.

(10)(a) The division is authorized to employ special function officers, as defined in
Section 53-13-105, to locate and apprehend minors who have absconded from division
custody, transport minors taken into custody pursuant to division policy, investigate cases,
and carry out other duties as assigned by the division.

(b) Special function officers may be employed through contract with the Department of
Public Safety, any P.O.S.T. certified law enforcement agency, or directly hired by the
division.

(11) The division shall designate employees to obtain the saliva DNA specimens required
under Section 53-10-403. The division shall ensure that the designated employees receive
appropriate training and that the specimens are obtained in accordance with accepted
protocol.

(12) The division shall register with the Department of Corrections any person who:

(a) has been adjudicated delinquent based on an offense listed in Subsection
77-27-21.5(l)(n)(i);

(b) has been committed to the division for secure confinement; and

(c) remains in the division's custody 30 days prior to the person's 21st birthday.
Utah Code Aim. §62A-7-201

(1) Children under 18 years of age, who are apprehended by any officer or brought
before any court for examination under any provision of state law, may not be confined
in jails, lockups, or cells used for persons 18 years of age or older who are charged with
crime, or in secure postadjudication correctional facilities operated by the division,
except as provided by specific statute and in conformance with standards approved by
the board.

(2)(a) Children charged by information or indictment with crimes as a serious youth
offender under Section 78A-6-702 or certified to stand trial as an adult pursuant to
Section 78A-6-703 may be detained in a jail or other place of detention used for adults.

(b) Children detained in adult facilities under Section 78A-6-702 or 78A-6-703 prior to

a hearing before a magistrate, or under Subsection 78A-6-113(3), may only be held in
certified juvenile detention accommodations in accordance with rules promulgated by
the division. Those rules shall include standards for acceptable sight and sound
separation from adult inmates. The division certifies facilities that are in compliance
with the division's standards.

(3) In areas of low density population, the division may, by rule, approve juvenile holding
accommodations within adult facilities that have acceptable sight and sound separation.
Those facilities shall be used only for short-term holding purposes, with a maximum
confinement of six hours, for children alleged to have committed an act which would be a
criminal offense if committed by an adult. Acceptable short-term holding purposes are:
identification, notification of juvenile court officials, processing, and allowance of
adequate time for evaluation of needs and circumstances regarding release or transfer to a
shelter or detention facility.

(4) Children who are alleged to have committed an act which would be a criminal offense
if committed by an adult, may be detained in holding rooms in local law enforcement
agency facilities for a maximum of two hours, for identification or interrogation, or while
awaiting release to a parent or other responsible adult. Those rooms shall be certified by
the division, according to the division's rules. Those rules shall include provisions for
constant supervision and for sight and sound separation from adult inmates.

(5) Willful failure to comply with any of the provisions of this section is a class B
misdemeanor.

(6)(a) The division is responsible for the custody and detention of children under 18 years
of age who require detention care prior to trial or examination, or while awaiting
assignment to a home or facility, as a dispositional placement under Subsection
78A-6-117(2)(f)(i) or 78A-6-1101(3)(a), and of youth offenders under Subsection
62A-7-504(8).

(b) The division shall provide standards for custody or detention under Subsections
(2)(b), (3), and (4), and shall determine and set standards for conditions of care and
confinement of children in detention facilities.

(c) All other custody or detention shall be provided by the division, or by contract with a

public or privale agency willing to undertake temporary custody or detention upon
agreed terms, or in suitable premises distinct and separate from the general jails,
lockups, or cells used in law enforcement and corrections systems.

Utah Code Ann. § 62G-3-202
(1) An agency's written statement is a rule if it conforms to the definition of a rule under
Section 63G-3-102, but the written statement is not enforceable unless it is made as a rule
in accordance with the requirements of this chapter.

(2) An agency's written statement that is made as a rule in accordance with the
requirements of this chapter is enforceable and has the effect of law.
Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-104
The provisions of this code shall be construed in accordance with these general purposes.

(1) Forbid and prevent the commission of offenses.

(2) Define adequately the conduct and mental state which constitute each offense and
safeguard conduct that is without fault from condemnation as criminal.

(3) Prescribe penalties which are proportionate to the seriousness of offenses and which
permit recognition or differences in rehabilitation possibilities among individual
offenders.

(4) Prevent arbitrary or oppressive treatment of persons accused or convicted of offenses.
Utah Code Ann. § 78-3a-30 (1994)
(1) (a) A child may not be placed or kept in a secure detention facility pending court
proceedings unless it is unsafe for the public to leave the child with his parents, guardian,
or custodian and the child is detainable based on guidelines promulgated by the Division
of Youth Corrections, within the Department of Human Services.

(b) A child who must be taken from his home but who does not require physical
restriction shall be given temporary care in a shelter facility and may not be placed in a
detention facility.

(c) A child may not be placed or kept in a shelter facility pending court proceedings
unless it is unsafe for the child to leave him with his parents, guardian, or custodian.

(2) After admission to a detention facility pursuant to the guidelines established by the
Division of Youth Corrections, and immediate investigation by an authorized officer of
the court, the judge or the officer shall order the release of the child to his parents,
guardian, or custodian if it is found he can be safely returned to their care, either upon
written promise to bring the child to the court at a time set, or without restriction.

(a) If the child's parent, legal guardian, or legal custodian fails to retrieve the child from
a facility within 24 hours after notification of release, the parent, legal guardian, or legal
custodian is responsible for the cost of care for the time the child remains in the facility.

(b) The facility shall determine the cost of care.

(c) Any money collected under this subsection shall be retained by the Division of
Youth Corrections to recover the cost of care for the time the child remains in the facility.

(3) (a) When a child is detained in a detention or shelter facility, the parents or guardian
shall be informed by the person in charge of the facility that they have the right to a
prompt hearing in court to determine whether the child is to be further detained or
released.

(b) Detention hearings shall be held by the judge or by a commissioner.

(c) The court may, at any time, order the release of the child, whether a detention
hearing is held or not.

(d) If the child is released, and the child remains in the facility, because the parents,

legal guardian, or legal custodian fails to retrieve the child, the parents, legal guardian, or
legal custodian shall be responsible for the cost of care as provided in Subsections (2)(a)
through (c).

(4) (a) A child may not be held in a detention facility longer than 48 hours prior to a
detention hearing, excluding weekends and holidays, unless the court has entered an order
for continued detention.

(b) A child may not be held in a shelter facility longer than 48 hours prior to a shelter
hearing, excluding weekends and holidays, unless a court order for extended shelter has
been entered by the court after notice to all parties described in Section 78-3a-306.

(c) A hearing for detention or shelter may not be waived. Detention staff shall provide
the court with all information received from the person who brought the child to the
detention facility.

(d) If the court finds, at a detention hearing, that it is not safe to release the child, the
judge or commissioner may order the child to be held in the facility or be placed in
another appropriate facility, subject to further order of the court.

(e) (i) After a detention hearing has been held, only the court may release a child from
detention. If a child remains in a detention facility, periodic reviews shall be held,
pursuant to the Utah State Juvenile Court Rules of Practice and Procedure, to ensure that
continued detention is necessary.

(ii) If the court orders home detention, it shall direct that notice of its order be
provided to designated persons in the appropriate local law enforcement agency and the
school or transferee school, if applicable, which the child attends. The designated persons
may receive the information for purposes of the child's supervision and student safety.

(iii) Any employee of the local law enforcement agency and the school which the child
attends who discloses the court's order of probation is not:

(A) civilly liable except when the disclosure constitutes fraud or malice as provided in

Section 63-30-4; and

(B) civilly or criminally liable except when disclosure constitutes a knowing violation
of Section 63-2-801.

(5) A child may not be held in a detention facility, following a dispositional order of the
court for nonsecure substitute care as defined in Section 62A-4a-101, or for
community-based placement under Section 62A-7-101 for longer than 72 hours,
excluding weekends and holidays. The period of detention may be extended by the court
for one period of seven calendar days if:

(a) the Division of Youth Corrections or another agency responsible for placement files
a written petition with the court requesting the extension and setting forth good cause;
and

(b) the court enters a written finding that it is in the best interests of both the child and
the community to extend the period of detention.

(6) The agency requesting an extension shall promptly notify the detention facility that a
written petition has been filed.

(7) The court shall promptly notify the detention facility regarding its initial disposition
and any ruling on a petition for an extension, whether granted or denied.

(8) (a) A child under 16 years of age may not be held in a jail, lockup, or other place for
adult detention except as provided by Section 62A-7-201 or unless certified as an adult
pursuant to Section 78-3a-25. The provisions of Section 62A-7-201 regarding
confinement facilities apply to this subsection.

(b) A child 16 years of age or older whose conduct or condition endangers the safety or
welfare of others in the detention facility for children may by court order that specifies the
reasons, be detained in another place of confinement considered appropriate by the court,
including a jail or other place of confinement for adults. However, a secure youth
corrections facility is not an appropriate place of confinement for detention purposes

under this section.

(9) A child held for criminal proceedings under Section 78-3a-25 may be detained in a
jail or other place of detention used for adults charged with crime.

(10) Provisions of law regarding bail are not applicable to children detained or taken
into custody under this chapter, except that bail may be allowed:

(a) if a child who need not be detained lives outside this state; or

(b) when a child who need not be detained comes within one of the classes in
Subsection 78-3a-22(4).
Utah Code Ann. § 78-3A-114
(l)(a) A minor may not be placed or kept in a secure detention facility pending court
proceedings unless it is unsafe for the public to leave the minor with the minor's parents,
guardian, or custodian and the minor is detainable based on guidelines promulgated by
the Division of Juvenile Justice Services.

(b) A child who must be taken from the child's home but who does not require physical
restriction shall be given temporary care in a shell er facility and may not be placed in a
detention facility.

(c) A child may not be placed or kept in a shelter facility pending court proceedings
unless it is unsafe to leave the child with the child's parents, guardian, or custodian.

(2) After admission of a child to a detention facility pursuant to the guidelines established
by the Division of Juvenile Justice Services and immediate investigation by an authorized
officer of the court, the judge or the officer shall order the release of the child to the
child's parents, guardian, or custodian if it is found the child can be safely returned to
their care, either upon written promise to bring the child to the court at a time set or
without restriction.

(a) If a child's parent, guardian, or custodian fails to retrieve the child from a facility
within 24 hours after notification of release, the parent, guardian, or custodian is
responsible for the cost of care for the time the child remains in the facility.

(b) The facility shall determine the cost of care.

(c) Any money collected under this Subsection (2) shall be retained by the Division of
Juvenile Justice Services to recover the cost of care for the time the child remains in the
facility.

(3)(a) When a child is detained in a detention or shelter facility, the parents or guardian
shall be informed by the person in charge of the facility that they have the right to a
prompt hearing in court to determine whether the child is to be further detained or
released.

(b) When a minor is detained in a detention facility, the minor shall be informed by the
person in charge of the facility that the minor has the right to a prompt hearing in court
to determine whether the minor is to be further detained or released.

(c) Detention hearings shall be held by the judge or by a commissioner.

(d) The court may, at any time, order the release of the minor, whether a detention
hearing is held or not.

(e) If a child is released, and the child remains in the facility, because the parents,
guardian, or custodian fails to retrieve the child, the parents, guardian, or custodian shall
be responsible for the cost of care as provided in Subsections (2)(a), (b), and (c).

(4)(a) A minor may not be held in a detention facility longer than 48 hours prior to a
detention hearing, excluding weekends and holidays, unless the court has entered an order
for continued detention.

(b) A child may not be held in a shelter facility longer than 48 hours prior to a shelter

hearing, excluding weekends and holidays, unless a court order for extended shelter has
been entered by the court after notice to all parties described in Section 78A-6-306.

(c) A hearing for detention or shelter may not be waived. Detention staff shall provide
the court with all information received from the person who brought the minor to the
detention facility.

(d) If the court finds at a detention hearing that it is not safe to release the minor, the
judge or commissioner may order the minor to be held in the facility or be placed in
another appropriate facility, subject to further order of the court.

(e)(i) After a detention hearing has been held, only the court may release a minor from
detention. If a minor remains in a detention facility, periodic reviews shall be held
pursuant to the Utah State Juvenile Court Rules of Practice and Procedure to ensure that
continued detention is necessary.

(ii) After a detention hearing for a violent felony, as defined in Section 76-3-203.5, or
an offense in violation of Title 76, Chapter 10, Part 5, Weapons, the court shall direct
that notice of its decision, including any disposition, order, or no contact orders, be
provided to designated persons in the appropriate local law enforcement agency and
district superintendent or the school or transferee school, if applicable, that the minor
attends. The designated persons may receive the information for purposes of the
minor's supervision and student safety.

(iii) Any employee of the local law enforcement agency, school district, and the school
that the minor attends who discloses the court's order of probation is not:

(A) civilly liable except when the disclosure constitutes fraud or willful misconduct
as provided in Section 63G-7-202; and

(B) civilly or criminally liable except when disclosure constitutes a knowing
violation of Section 63G-2-801.

(5) A minor may not be held in a detention facility, following a dispositional order of the

court for nonsecure substitute care as defined in Section 62A-4a-101, or for
community-based placement under Section 62A-7-101 for longer than 72 hours,
excluding weekends and holidays. The period of detention may be extended by the court
for one period of seven calendar days if:

(a) the Division of Juvenile Justice Services or another agency responsible for
placement files a written petition with the court requesting the extension and setting
forth good cause; and

(b) the court enters a written finding that it is in the best interests of both the minor and
the community to extend the period of detention.

(6) The agency requesting an extension shall promptly notify the detention facility that a
written petition has been filed.

(7) The court shall promptly notify the detention facility regarding its initial disposition
and any ruling on a petition for an extension, whether granted or denied.

(8)(a) A child under 16 years of age may not be held in a jail, lockup, or other place for
adult detention except as provided by Section 62A-7-201 or unless certified as an adult
pursuant to Section 78A-6-703. The provisions of Section 62A-7-201 regarding
confinement facilities apply to this Subsection (8).

(b) A child 16 years of age or older whose conduct or condition endangers the safety or
welfare of others in the detention facility for children may, by court order that specifies
the reasons, be detained in another place of confinement considered appropriate by the
court, including a jail or other place of confinement for adults. However, a secure youth
corrections facility is not an appropriate place of confinement for detention purposes
under this section.

(9) A sheriff, warden, or other official in charge of a jail or other facility for the detention
of adult offenders or persons charged with crime shall immediately notify the juvenile
court when a person who is or appears to be under 18 years of age is received at the
facility and shall make arrangements for the transfer of the person to a detention facility,
unless otherwise ordered by the juvenile court.

(10) This section does not apply to a minor who is brought to the adult facility under
charges pursuant to Section 78A-6-702 or by order of the juvenile court to be held for
criminal proceedings in the district court under Section 78A-6-703.

(11) A minor held for criminal proceedings under Section 78A-6-702 or 78A-6-703 may
be detained in a jail or other place of detention used for adults charged with crime.

(12) Provisions of law regarding bail are not applicable to minors detained or taken into
custody under this chapter, except that bail may be allowed:

(a) if a minor who need not be detained lives outside this state; or

(b) when a minor who need not be detained comes within one of the classes in
Subsection 78A-6-603(l 1).

(13) Section 76-8-418 is applicable to a child who willfully and intentionally commits an
act against a jail or other place of confinement, including a Division of Juvenile Justice
Services detention, shelter, or secure confinement facility which would be a third degree
felony if committed by an adult.

Utah Code Ann. § 78A-6-103
(1) Except as otherwise provided by law, the juvenile court has exclusive original
jurisdiction in proceedings concerning:

(a) a child who has violated any federal, state, or local law or municipal ordinance or a
person younger than 21 years of age who has violated any law or ordinance before
becoming 18 years of age, regardless of where the violation occurred, excluding
offenses in Subsection 78A-7-106(2);

(b) a person 21 years of age or older who has failed or refused to comply with an order

of the juvenile court to pay a fine or restitution, if the order was imposed prior to the
person's 21st birthday; however, the continuing jurisdiction is limited to causing
compliance with existing orders;

(c) a child who is an abused child, neglected child, or dependent child, as those terms
are defined in Section 78A-6-105;

(d) a protective order for a child pursuant to the provisions of Title 78B, Chapter 7, Part
2, Child Protective Orders, which the juvenile court may transfer to the district court if
the juvenile court has entered an ex parte protective order and finds that:

(i) the petitioner and the respondent are the natural parent, adoptive parent, or step
parent of the child who is the object of the petition;

(ii) the district court has a petition pending or an order related to custody or
parent-time entered under Title 30, Chapter 3, Divorce, Title 78B, Chapter 7, Part 1,
Cohabitant Abuse Act, or Title 78B, Chapter 15, Utah Uniform Parentage Act, in
which the petitioner and the respondent are parties; and

(iii) the best interests of the child will be better served in the district court;

(e) appointment of a guardian of the person or other guardian of a minor who comes
within the court's jurisdiction under other provisions of this section;

(f) the emancipation of a minor in accordance with Part 8, Emancipation;

(g) the termination of the legal parent-child relationship in accordance with Part 5,
Termination of Parental Rights Act, including termination of residual parental rights
and duties;

(h) the treatment or commitment of a mentally retarded minor;

(i) a minor who is a habitual truant from school;

(j) the judicial consent to the marriage of a child under age 16 upon a determination of
voluntariness or where otherwise required by law, employment, or enlistment of a child
when consent is required by law;

(k) any parent or parents of a child committed to a secure youth corrections facility, to
order, at the discretion of the court and on the recommendation of a secure facility, the
parent or parents of a child committed to a secure facility for a custodial term, to
undergo group rehabilitation therapy under the direction of a secure facility therapist,
who has supervision of that parent's or parents' child, or any other therapist the court
may direct, for a period directed by the court as recommended by a secure facility;

(1) a minor under Title 55, Chapter 12, Interstate Compact for Juveniles;

(m) the treatment or commitment of a mentally ill child. The court may commit a child
to the physical custody of a local mental health authority in accordance with the
procedures and requirements of Title 62A, Chapter 15, Part 7, Commitment of Persons
Under Age 18 to Division of Substance Abuse and Mental Health , but not directly to
the Utah State Hospital;

(n) the commitment of a child in accordance with Section 62A-15-301;

(o) de novo review of final agency actions resulting from an informal adjudicative
proceeding as provided in Section 63G-4-402; and

(p) adoptions conducted in accordance with the procedures described in Title 78B,
Chapter 6, Part 1, Utah Adoption Act, when the juvenile court has previously entered an
order terminating the rights of a parent and finds that adoption is in the best interest of
the child.

(2) Notwithstanding Section 78A-7-106 and Subsection 78A-5-102(9), the juvenile court
has exclusive jurisdiction over the following offenses committed by a child:

(a) Title 41, Chapter 6a, Part 5, Driving Under the Influence and Reckless Driving;

(b) Section 73-18-12, reckless operation; and

(c) class B and C misdemeanors, infractions, or violations of ordinances that are part of
a single criminal episode filed in a petition that contains an offense over which the court
has jurisdiction.

(3) The juvenile court has jurisdiction over an ungovernable or runaway child who is
referred to it by the Division of Child and Family Services or by public or private
agencies that contract with the division to provide services to that child where, despite
earnest and persistent efforts by the division or agency, the child has demonstrated that
the child:

(a) is beyond the control of the child's parent, guardian, lawful custodian, or school
authorities to the extent that the child's behavior or condition endangers the child's own
welfare or the welfare of others; or

(b) has run away from home.

(4) This section does not restrict the right of access to the juvenile court by private
agencies or other persons.

(5) The juvenile court has jurisdiction of all magistrate functions relative to cases arising
under Section 78A-6-702.

(6) The juvenile court has jurisdiction to make a finding of substantiated, unsubstantiated,
or without merit, in accordance with Section 78A-6-323.

(7) The juvenile court has jurisdiction of matters transferred to it by another trial court
pursuant to Subsection 78A-7-106(7).

Utah Code Ann. § 78A-6-113

(l)(a) A minor may not be placed or kept in a secure detention facility pending court
proceedings unless it is unsafe for the public to leave the minor with the minor's parents,
guardian, or custodian and the minor is detainable based on guidelines promulgated by
the Division of Juvenile Justice Services.

(b) A child who must be taken from the child's home but who does not require physical
restriction shall be given temporary care in a shelter facility and may not be placed in a
detention facility.

(c) A child may not be placed or kept in a shelter facility pending court proceedings
unless it is unsafe to leave the child with the child's parents, guardian, or custodian.

(2) After admission of a child to a detention facility pursuant to the guidelines established
by the Division of Juvenile Justice Services and immediate investigation by an authorized
officer of the court, the judge or the officer shall order the release of the child to the
child's parents, guardian, or custodian if it is found the child can be safely returned to
their care, either upon written promise to bring the child to the court at a time set or
without restriction.

(a) If a child's parent, guardian, or custodian fails to retrieve the child from a facility
within 24 hours after notification of release, the parent, guardian, or custodian is
responsible for the cost of care for the time the child remains in the facility.

(b) The facility shall determine the cost of care.

(c) Any money collected under this Subsection (2) shall be retained by the Division of
Juvenile Justice Services to recover the cost of care for the time the child remains in the
facility.

(3)(a) When a child is detained in a detention or shelter facility, the parents or guardian
shall be informed by the person in charge of the facility that they have the right to a
prompt hearing in court to determine whether the child is to be further detained or
released.

(b) When a minor is detained in a detention facility, the minor shall be informed by the
person in charge of the facility that the minor has the right to a prompt hearing in court
to determine whether the minor is to be further detained or released.

(c) Detention hearings shall be held by the judge or by a commissioner.

(d) The court may, at any time, order the release of the minor, whether a detention
hearing is held or not.

(e) If a child is released, and the child remains in the facility, because the parents,
guardian, or custodian fails to retrieve the child, the parents, guardian, or custodian shall
be responsible for the cost of care as provided in Subsections (2)(a), (b), and (c).

(4)(a) A minor may not be held in a detention facility longer than 48 hours prior to a
detention hearing, excluding weekends and holidays, unless the court has entered an order
for continued detention.

(b) A child may not be held in a shelter facility longer than 48 hours prior to a shelter
hearing, excluding weekends and holidays, unless a court order for extended shelter has
been entered by the court after notice to all parties described in Section 78A-6-306.

(c) A hearing for detention or shelter may not be waived. Detention staff shall provide
the court with all information received from the person who brought the minor to the

detention facility.

(d) If the court finds at a detention hearing that it is not safe to release the minor, the
judge or commissioner may order the minor to be held in the facility or be placed in
another appropriate facility, subject to further order of the court.

(e)(i) After a detention hearing has been held, only the court may release a minor from
detention. If a minor remains in a detention facility, periodic reviews shall be held
pursuant to the Utah State Juvenile Court Rules of Practice and Procedure to ensure that
continued detention is necessary.

(ii) After a detention hearing for a violent felony, as defined in Section 76-3-203.5, or
an offense in violation of Title 76, Chapter 10, Part 5, Weapons, the court shall direct
that notice of its decision, including any disposition, order, or no contact orders, be
provided to designated persons in the appropriate local law enforcement agency and
district superintendent or the school or transferee school, if applicable, that the minor
attends. The designated persons may receive the information for purposes of the
minor's supervision and student safety.

(iii) Any employee of the local law enforcement agency, school district, and the school
that the minor attends who discloses the court's order of probation is not:

(A) civilly liable except when the disclosure constitutes fraud or willful misconduct
as provided in Section 63G-7-202; and

(B) civilly or criminally liable except when disclosure constitutes a knowing
violation of Section 63G-2-801.

(5) A minor may not be held in a detention facility, following a dispositional order of the
court for nonsecure substitute care as defined in Section 62A-4a-101, or for
community-based placement under Section 62A-7-101 for longer than 72 hours,
excluding weekends and holidays. The period of detention may be extended by the court
for one period of seven calendar days if:

(a) the Division of Juvenile Justice Services or another agency responsible for
placement files a written petition with the court requesting the extension and setting
forth good cause; and

(b) the court enters a written finding that it is in the best interests of both the minor and
the community to extend the period of detention.

(6) The agency requesting an extension shall promptly notify the detention facility that a
written petition has been filed.

(7) The court shall promptly notify the detention facility regarding its initial disposition
and any ruling on a petition for an extension, whether granted or denied.

(8)(a) A child under 16 years of age may not be held in a jail, lockup, or other place for
adult detention except as provided by Section 62A-7-201 or unless certified as an adult
pursuant to Section 78A-6-703. The provisions of Section 62A-7-201 regarding
confinement facilities apply to this Subsection (8).

(b) A child 16 years of age or older whose conduct or condition endangers the safety or
welfare of others in the detention facility for children may, by court order that specifies
the reasons, be detained in another place of confinement considered appropriate by the
court, including a jail or other place of confinement for adults. However, a secure youth
corrections facility is not an appropriate place of confinement for detention purposes
under this section.

(9) A sheriff, warden, or other official in charge of a jail or other facility for the detention
of adult offenders or persons charged with crime shall immediately notify the juvenile
court when a person who is or appears to be under 18 years of age is received at the
facility and shall make arrangements for the transfer of the person to a detention facility,
unless otherwise ordered by the juvenile court.

(10) This section does not apply to a minor who is brought to the adult facility under
charges pursuant to Section 78A-6-702 or by order of the juvenile court to be held for
criminal proceedings in the district court under Section 78A-6-703.

(11) A minor held for criminal proceedings under Section 78A-6-702 or 78A-6-703 may
be detained in a jail or other place of detention used for adults charged with crime.

(12) Provisions of law regarding bail are not applicable to minors detained or taken into
custody under this chapter, except that bail may be allowed:

(a) if a minor who need not be detained lives outside this state; or

(b) when a minor who need not be detained comes within one of the classes in
Subsection 78A-6-603(l 1).

(13) Section 76-8-418 is applicable to a child who willfully and intentionally commits an
act against a jail or other place of confinement, including a Division of Juvenile Justice
Services detention, shelter, or secure confinement facility which would be a third degree
felony if committed by an adult.
Utah Code Ann. § 78A-6-701

(1) The district court shall have exclusive original jurisdiction over all persons 16 years of
age or older charged by information or indictment with:

(a) an offense which would be murder or aggravated murder if committed by an adult;
or

(b) an offense which would be a felony if committed by an adult if the minor has been
previously committed to a secure facility as defined in Section 62A-7-101. This
Subsection (l)(b) shall not apply if the offense is committed in a secure facility.

(2) When the district court has exclusive original jurisdiction over a minor under this
section, it also has exclusive original jurisdiction over the minor regarding all offenses
joined with the qualifying offense, and any other offenses, including misdemeanors,
arising from the same criminal episode. The district court is not divested of jurisdiction
by virtue of the fact that the minor is allowed to enter a plea to, or is found guilty of, a
lesser or joined offense.

(3)(a) Any felony, misdemeanor, or infraction committed after the offense over which the
district court takes jurisdiction under Subsection (1) or (2) shall be tried against the
defendant as an adult in the district court or justice court having jurisdiction.

(b) If the qualifying charge under Subsection (1) results in an acquittal, a finding of not
guilty, or a dismissal of the charge in the district court, the juvenile court under Section
78A-6-103 and the Division of Juvenile Justice Services regain jurisdiction and any
authority previously exercised over the minor.

Utah Code Ann. § 78A-6-702
(1) Any action filed by a county attorney, district attorney, or attorney general charging
a minor 16 years of age or older with a felony shall be by criminal information and filed
in the juvenile court if the information charges any of the following offenses:

(a) any felony violation of:

(i) Section 76-6-103, aggravated arson;

(ii) Subsection 76-5-103(l)(a), aggravated assault, involving intentionally causing
serious bodily injury to another;

(iii) Section 76-5-302, aggravated kidnaping;

(iv) Section 76-6-203, aggravated burglary;

(v) Section 76-6-302, aggravated robbery;

(vi) Section 76-5-405, aggravated sexual assault;

(vii) Section 76-10-508, discharge of a firearm from a vehicle;

(viii) Section 76-5-202, attempted aggravated murder; or

(ix) Section 76-5-203, attempted murder; or

(b) an offense other than those listed in Subsection (l)(a) involving the use of a
dangerous weapon which would be a felony if committed by an adult, and the minor has
been previously adjudicated or convicted of an offense involving the use of a dangerous
weapon which also would have been a felony if committed by an adult.

(2) All proceedings before the juvenile court related to charges filed under Subsection (1)
shall be conducted in conformity with the rules established by the Utah Supreme Court.

(3)(a) If the information alleges the violation of a felony listed in Subsection (1), the state
shall have the burden of going forward with its case and the burden of proof to establish
probable cause to believe that one of the crimes listed in Subsection (1) has been
committed and that the defendant committed it. If proceeding under Subsection (l)(b),
the state shall have the additional burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence
that the defendant has previously been adjudicated or convicted of an offense involving
the use of a dangerous weapon.

(b) If the juvenile court judge finds the state has met its burden under this Subsection
(3), the court shall order that the defendant be bound over and held to answer in the
district court in the same manner as an adult unless the juvenile court judge finds that all
of the following conditions exist:

(i) the minor has not been previously adjudicated delinquent for an offense involving
the use of a dangerous weapon which would be a felony if committed by an adult;

(ii) that if the offense was committed with one or more other persons, the minor
appears to have a lesser degree of culpability than the codefendants; and

(iii) that the minor's role in the offense was not committed in a violent, aggressive, or
premeditated manner.

(c) Once the state has met its burden under this Subsection (3) as to a showing of
probable cause, the defendant shall have the burden of going forward and presenting
evidence as to the existence of the above conditions.

(d) If the juvenile court judge finds by clear and convincing evidence that all the above
conditions are satisfied, the court shall so state in its findings and order the minor held
for trial as a minor and shall proceed upon the information as though it were a juvenile
petition.

(4) If the juvenile court judge finds that an offense has been committed, but that the state
has not met its burden of proving the other criteria needed to bind the defendant over
under Subsection (1), the juvenile court judge shall order the defendant held for trial as a
minor and shall proceed upon the information as though it were a juvenile petition.

(5) At the time of a bind over to district court a criminal warrant of arrest shall issue. The
defendant shall have the same right to bail as any other criminal defendant and shall be
advised of that right by the juvenile court judge. The juvenile court shall set initial bail in
accordance with Title 77, Chapter 20, Bail.

(6) If an indictment is returned by a grand jury charging a violation under this section, the
preliminary examination held by the juvenile court judge need not include a finding of
probable cause that the crime alleged in the indictment was committed and that the
defendant committed it, but the juvenile court shall proceed in accordance with this
section regarding the additional considerations listed in Subsection (3)(b).

(7) When a defendant is charged with multiple criminal offenses in the same information
or indictment and is bound over to answer in the district court for one or more charges
under this section, other offenses arising from the same criminal episode and any
subsequent misdemeanors or felonies charged against him shall be considered together
with those charges, and where the court finds probable cause to believe that those crimes
have been committed and that the defendant committed them, the defendant shall also be
bound over to the district court to answer for those charges.

(8) A minor who is bound over to answer as an adult in the district court under this
section or on whom an indictment has been returned by a grand jury is not entitled to a
preliminary examination in the district court.

(9) Allegations contained in the indictment or information that the defendant has
previously been adjudicated or convicted of an offense involving the use of a dangerous
weapon, or is 16 years of age or older, are not elements of the criminal offense and do not
need to be proven at trial in the district court.

(10) If a minor enters a plea to, or is found guilty of, any of the charges filed or any other
offense arising from the same criminal episode, the district court retains jurisdiction over
the minor for all purposes, including sentencing.

(11) The juvenile court under Section 78A-6-103 and the Division of Juvenile Justice
Services regain jurisdiction and any authority previously exercised over the minor when
there is an acquittal, a finding of not guilty, or dismissal of all charges in the district court.

Utah Code Ann, § 78A-6-703
(1) If a criminal information filed in accordance with Subsection 78A-6-602(3) alleges
the commission of an act which would constitute a felony if committed by an adult, the
juvenile court shall conduct a preliminary hearing.

(2) At the preliminary hearing the state shall have the burden of going forward with its
case and the burden of establishing:

(a) probable cause to believe that a crime was committed and that the defendant
committed it; and

(b) by a preponderance of the evidence, that it would be contrary to the best interests of
the minor or of the public for the juvenile court to retain jurisdiction.

(3) In considering whether or not it would be contrary to the best interests of the minor or
of the public for the juvenile court to retain jurisdiction, the juvenile court shall consider,
and may base its decision on, the finding of one or more of the following factors:

(a) the seriousness of the offense and whether the protection of the community requires
isolation of the minor beyond that afforded by juvenile facilities;

(b) whether the alleged offense was committed by the minor in concert with two or
more persons under circumstances which would subject the minor to enhanced penalties
under Section 76-3-203.1 were he an adult;

(c) whether the alleged offense was committed in an aggressive, violent, premeditated,
or willful manner;

(d) whether the alleged offense was against persons or property, greater weight being
given to offenses against persons, except as provided in Section 76-8- 418;

(e) the maturity of the minor as determined by considerations of his home, environment,
emotional attitude, and pattern of living;

(f) the record and previous history of the minor;

(g) the likelihood of rehabilitation of the minor by use of facilities available to the
juvenile court;

(h) the desirability of trial and disposition of the entire offense in one court when the
minor's associates in the alleged offense are adults who will be charged with a crime in
the district court;

(i) whether the minor used a firearm in the commission of an offense; and

(3) In considering whether or not it would be contrary to the best interests of the minor or
of the public for the juvenile court to retain jurisdiction, the juvenile court shall consider,
and may base its decision on, the finding of one or more of the following factors:

(a) the seriousness of the offense and whether the protection of the community requires
isolation of the minor beyond that afforded by juvenile facilities;

(b) whether the alleged offense was committed by the minor in concert with two or
more persons under circumstances which would subject the minor to enhanced penalties
under Section 76-3-203.1 were he an adult;

(c) whether the alleged offense was committed in an aggressive, violent, premeditated,
or willful manner;

(d) whether the alleged offense was against persons or property, greater weight being
given to offenses against persons, except as provided in Section 76-8- 418;

(e) the maturity of the minor as determined by considerations of his home, environment,
emotional attitude, and pattern of living;

(f) the record and previous history of the minor;

(g) the likelihood of rehabilitation of the minor by use of facilities available to the
juvenile court;

(h) the desirability of trial and disposition of the entire offense in one court when the
minor's associates in the alleged offense are adults who will be charged with a crime in
the district court;

(i) whether the minor used a firearm in the commission of an offense; and

(j) whether the minor possessed a dangerous weapon on or about school premises as
provided in Section 76-10-505.5.

(4) The amount of weight to be given to each of the factors listed in Subsection (3) is
discretionary with the court.

(5)(a) Written reports and other materials relating to the minor's mental, physical,
educational, and social history may be considered by the court.

(b) If requested by the minor, the minor's parent, guardian, or other interested party, the
court shall require the person or agency preparing the report and other material to
appear and be subject to both direct and cross-examination.

(6) At the conclusion of the state's case, the minor may testify under oath, call witnesses,
cross-examine adverse witnesses, and present evidence on the factors required by
Subsection (3).

(7) If the court finds the state has met its burden under Subsection (2), the court may enter
an order:

(a) certifying that finding; and

(b) directing that the minor be held for criminal proceedings in the district court

(8) If an indictment is returned by a grand jury, the preliminary examination held by the
juvenile court need not include a finding of probable cause, but the juvenile court shall
proceed in accordance with this section regarding the additional consideration referred to
in Subsection (2)(b).

(9) The provisions of Section 78A-6-115, Section 78A-6-1 111, and other provisions
relating to proceedings in juvenile cases are applicable to the hearing held under this
section to the extent they are pertinent.

(10) A minor who has been directed to be held for criminal proceedings in the district
court is not entitled to a preliminary examination in the district court.

(11) A minor who has been certified for trial in the district court shall have the same right
to bail as any other criminal defendant and shall be advised of that right by the juvenile
court judge. The juvenile court shall set initial bail in accordance with Title 77, Chapter
20, Bail.

(12) When a minor has been certified to the district court under this section or when a
criminal information or indictment is filed in a court of competent jurisdiction before a
committing magistrate charging the minor with an offense described in Section
78A-6-702, the jurisdiction of the Division of Juvenile Justice Services and the
jurisdiction of the juvenile court over the minor is terminated regarding that offense, any
other offenses arising from the same criminal episode, and any subsequent misdemeanors
or felonies charged against him, except as provided in Subsection (14).

(13) If a minor enters a plea to, or is found guilty of any of the charges filed or on any
other offense arising out of the same criminal episode, the district court retains
jurisdiction over the minor for all purposes, including sentencing.

(14) The juvenile court under Section 78A-6-103 and the Division of Juvenile Justice
Services regain jurisdiction and any authority previously exercised over the minor when
there is an acquittal, a finding of not guilty, or dismissal of all charges in the district court.

Utah Code Ann. § 78A-6-704
(1) A minor may, as a matter of right, appeal from:

(a) an order of the juvenile court binding the minor over to the district court as a serious
youth offender pursuant to Section 78A-6-702; or

(b) an order of the juvenile court, after certification proceedings pursuant to Section
78A-6-703, directing that the minor be held for criminal proceedings in the district
court.

(2) The prosecution may, as a matter of right, appeal from:

(a) an order of the juvenile court that a minor charged as a serious youth offender
pursuant to Section 78A-6-702 be held for trial in the juvenile court; or

(b) a refusal by the juvenile court, after certification proceedings pursuant to Section
78A-6-703, to order that a minor be held for criminal proceedings in the district court.

Utah Code Ann. § 78A-7-106
(1) Justice courts have jurisdiction over class B and C misdemeanors, violation of
ordinances, and infractions committed within their territorial jurisdiction by a person 18
years of age or older.

(2) Except those offenses over which the juvenile court has exclusive jurisdiction, justice
courts have jurisdiction over the following class B and C misdemeanors, violation of
ordinances, and infractions committed within their territorial jurisdiction by a person 16
years of age or older:

(a) Title 23, Wildlife Resources Code of Utah;

(b) Title 41, Chapter la, Motor Vehicle Act;

(c) Title 41, Chapter 6a, Traffic Code;

(d) Title 41, Chapter 12a, Motor Vehicle Financial Responsibility Act;

(e) Title 41, Chapter 22, Off-Highway Vehicles;

(f) Title 73, Chapter 18, Safe Boating Act;

(g) Title 73, Chapter 18a, Boating-Litter and Pollution Control;

(h) Title 73, Chapter 18b, Water Safety; and

(i) Title 73, Chapter 18c, Financial Responsibility of Motorboat Owners and Operators
Act.

(3) Justice Courts have jurisdiction over class C misdemeanor violations of Title 53,
Chapter 3, Part 2, Driver Licensing Act.
(4) As used in this section, "the court's jurisdiction5" means the territorial jurisdiction of a
justice court.

(5) An offense is committed within the territorial jurisdiction of a justice court if:

(a) conduct constituting an element of the offense or a result constituting an element of
the offense occurs within the court's jurisdiction, regardless of whether the conduct or
result is itself unlawful;

(b) either a person committing an offense or a victim of an offense is located within the
court's jurisdiction at the time the offense is committed;

(c) either a cause of injury occurs within the court's jurisdiction or the injury occurs
within the court's jurisdiction;

(d) a person commits any act constituting an element of an inchoate offense within the
court's jurisdiction, including an agreement in a conspiracy;

(e) a person solicits, aids, or abets, or attempts to solicit, aid, or abet another person in
the planning or commission of an offense within the court's jurisdiction;

(f) the investigation of the offense does not readily indicate in which court's jurisdiction
the offense occurred, and:

(i) the offense is committed upon or in any railroad car, vehicle, watercraft, or aircraft
passing within the court's jurisdiction;

(ii)(A) the offense is committed on or in any body of water bordering on or within this
state if the territorial limits of the justice court are adjacent to the body of water; and

(B) as used in Subsection (3)(f)(ii)(A), "body of water" includes any stream, river,
lake, or reservoir, whether natural or man-made;

(iii) a person who commits theft exercises control over the affected property within
the court's jurisdiction; or

(iv) the offense is committed on or near the boundary of the court's jurisdiction}

(g) the offense consists of an unlawful communication that was initiated or received
within the court's jurisdiction; or

(h) jurisdiction is otherwise specifically provided by law.

(6) Justice courts have jurisdiction of small claims cases under Title 78 A, Chapter 8,
Small Claims Courts, if a defendant resides in or the debt arose within the territorial
jurisdiction of the justice court.

(7) A justice court judge may transfer a matter in which the defendant is a child to the
juvenile court for further proceedings after judgment in the justice court.

Utah Code Ann. § 78A-7-602
(1) A proceeding in a minor's case is commenced by petition.

(2)(a) A peace officer or any public official of the state, any county, city, or town charged
with the enforcement of the laws of the state or local jurisdiction shall file a formal
referral with the juvenile court within ten days of a minor's arrest. If the arrested minor is
taken to a detention facility, the formal referral shall be filed with the juvenile court
within 72 hours, excluding weekends and holidays. There shall be no requirement to file a
formal referral with the juvenile court on an offense that would be a class B misdemeanor
or less if committed by an adult.

(b) When the court is informed by a peace officer or other person that a minor is or
appears to be within the court's jurisdiction, the probation department shall make a
preliminary inquiry to determine whether the interests of the public or of the minor
require that further action be taken.

(c) Based on the preliminary inquiry, the court may authorize the filing of or request that
the county attorney or district attorney as provided under Sections 17-18-1 and
17-18-1.7 file a petition. In its discretion, the court may, through its probation
department, enter into a written consent agreement with the minor and, if the minor is a
child, the minor's parent, guardian, or custodian for the nonjudicial adjustment of the
case if the facts are admitted and establish prima facie jurisdiction. Efforts to effect a
nonjudicial adjustment may not extend for a period of more than 90 days without leave
of a judge of the court, who may extend the period for an additional 90 days.

(d) The nonjudicial adjustment of a case may include conditions agreed upon as part of
the nonjudicial closure:

(i) payment of a financial penalty of not more than $250 to the Juvenile Court;

(ii) payment of victim restitution;

(iii) satisfactory completion of compensatory service;

(iv) referral to an appropriate provider for counseling or treatment;

(v) attendance at substance abuse programs or counseling programs;

(vi) compliance with specified restrictions on activities and associations; and

(vii) other reasonable actions that are in the interest of the child or minor and the
community.

(e) Proceedings involving offenses under Section 78A-6-606 are governed by that
section regarding suspension of driving privileges.

(f) A violation of Section 76-10-105 that is subject to the jurisdiction of the Juvenile
Court shall include a minimum fine or penalty of $60 and participation in a
court-approved tobacco education program, which may include a participation fee.

(3) Except as provided in Section 78A-6-702, in the case of a minor 14 years of age or
older, the county attorney, district attorney, or attorney general may commence an action
by filing a criminal information and a motion requesting the juvenile court to waive its
jurisdiction and certify the minor to the district court.

(4)(a) In cases of violations of wildlife laws, boating laws, class B and class C
misdemeanors, other infractions or misdemeanors as designated by general order of the
Board of Juvenile Court Judges, and violations of Section 76-10-105 subject to the|
jurisdiction of the Juvenile Court, a petition is not required and the issuance of a citation
as provided in Section 78A-6-603 is sufficient to invoke the jurisdiction of the court. A
preliminary inquiry is not required unless requested by the court.

(b) Any failure to comply with the time deadline on a formal referral may not be the
basis of dismissing the formal referral.

